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How do mergers and acquisitions affect bondholders in Europe? 




Abstract – This paper contributes to the comparative corporate governance literature by showing how 
cross-country differences in governance and legal standards affect the bondholder wealth effects of 
European  merger  and  acquisitions  (M&As).  Using  investment-grade  Eurobonds,  we  find  some 
remarkable  results.  Firstly,  M&As  involving  European  firms  are  considerably  more  bondholder-
friendly than are US domestic deals. Bidding firm bondholders earn economically significant positive 
returns,  while  target  bondholders  incur  positive  but  insignificant  returns.  Overall,  acquisitions  do 
generate value to European bidding firms, but most of the wealth effect is captured by the bondholders. 
Secondly, bondholder gains in both bidding and target firms are systematically higher in M&As that 
involve Continental European firms. Thirdly, bidder abnormal bond returns are lower in cross-border 
deals.  However,  this  is  counterbalanced  if  creditor  rights  and  the  efficiency  of  credit  contract 
enforcement are stronger in the target country. There is also strong evidence that, consistent with cross-
border spillovers, improved creditor protection redistributes wealth from shareholders to bondholders. 
Finally, we document that bondholder wealth changes are subject to changes in asset risk and to a 






The European market for corporate control has evolved immensely over the past decade. The value 
of European mergers and acquisitions (M&As) is estimated at US$ 1 trillion for 2005, which is still 
below the historical peaks recorded in 1999 and 2000. Europe’s world share of transaction value has 
also been climbing and now reaches more than 40% (Martynova and Renneboog, 2006a). A key aspect 
of  this  trend  is  the  considerable  diversity  of  European  countries  from  a  corporate  governance 
perspective.  This  has  pronounced  economic  implications  for  cross-border  M&As,  where  there  is 
evidence of spillovers in governance structures, accounting standards and disclosure practices. Such 
considerations have been shown to affect shareholder returns (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005), but 
also to influence the choice of target firms (Rossi and Volpin, 2004), the method of payment (Faccio 
and Masulis, 2005) and even the valuation of industries where the cross-border takeovers occur (Bris 
and Cabolis, 2002).  
If shareholder wealth changes exhibit great cross-country variation in European M&As, so could the 
wealth  changes  incurred  by  corporate  bondholders.  In  the  Anglo-American  market-oriented 
governance regimes, creditors are seen as independent parties contracting with the firm, and have little 
influence on corporate decision making. In the stakeholder-oriented systems of Continental Europe, 
banks  and  other  risk-averse  stakeholders  exercise  greater  control,  which  should  make  M&As 
inherently more bondholder-friendly. In cross-border M&As, the combination of the two governance 
structures could instigate considerable changes in bondholder wealth. Another important feature of 
cross-border deals is that they combine firms from jurisdictions that protect creditor rights to varying 
degrees. New exposure to a jurisdiction with better creditor rights is likely to force management to 




jurisdiction shopping, whereby creditors seek out the jurisdiction that best supports their legal position 
and ensures maximum satisfaction for their claims. 
Existing studies on bondholder wealth preclude the impact of such institutional factors by confining 
their focus to US domestic deals. Rather, they test three main hypotheses on the risk effects of M&As. 
Firstly, bondholders benefit at the expense of shareholders from reduced risk through a co-insurance of 
cash flows i.e. reduced cash flow variability in the combined firm (Galai and Masulis, 1976). Secondly, 
the changes in bondholder wealth are affected by the relative pre-merger riskiness of bidder and target 
(Shastri, 1990). And thirdly, shareholders may reverse bondholder gains by increasing leverage at the 
event (by making a debt-financed cash offer) or subsequently (Dennis and McConnell, 1986). Overall, 
there is little evidence of bondholders benefiting from co-insurance effects at all. Billett et al. (2004) 
report losses for the bondholders of bidding firms, while the bondholders of targets gain in junk-grade 
but lose in investment-grade firms. Earlier, Eger (1983) finds significant bondholder gains, but she 
only considers stock-for-stock deals to omit wealth reversals through the payment method. Maquieira 
et al. (1998) confirm these gains for non-diversifying mergers only, where more new wealth is created 
but the scope for co-insurance is otherwise limited. Kim and McConnell (1977), Asquith and Kim 
(1982), Walker (1994) and Dennis and McConnell (1986) find that bondholders are unaffected by 
M&As. 
This paper expands on these results by showing how cross-country differences in governance and 
legal standards affect the bondholder wealth effects of M&As. We use euro- and sterling-denominated 
Eurobonds  to  investigate  bond  price  changes  around  both  domestic  and  cross-border  M&A 
announcements  across  Europe.  The  scope  of  this paper  is  thus  limited  to  investment-grade  firms, 
whose bondholders should benefit relatively less from risk reductions brought about by M&As than 
bondholders holding low-investment grade paper. However, Eurobonds constitute the only European 
corporate bond market that is sufficiently large, liquid and standardized to allow for the construction of 
robust, closely fitted pricing benchmarks. 
Our analysis delivers some remarkable results. Firstly, acquisitions by European bidding firms are 
generally more bondholder-friendly than are US domestic deals. Bidder bondholders earn wealth gains 
that are highly significant both statistically and economically. There is also evidence of an increase in 
the  total  value  of  bidders,  without  a  significant  change  in  shareholder  wealth.  This  suggests  that 
acquisitions do create value for European bidders, but the bulk of the new wealth is accrued to the 
creditors  in  the  form  of  reduced  risk.  In  target  firms,  bondholder  returns  are  also  positive  but 
insignificantly different from zero.  
Secondly, bondholder gains in both bidders and targets are systematically higher ceteris paribus in 
M&As  that  involve  Continental  European  firms.  Thus,  the  bondholder  gains  observed  earlier  are 
largely  driven by  the  better  representation  of  creditor  interests  in  stakeholder-oriented  governance 
regimes.  Greater  creditor  influence  over  capital  structure  decisions  may  also  explain  why  the 
bondholders  of  Continental  European  bidders  respond  to  asset  risk  changes  related  to  business 
operations, but not to financial risk changes related to financing policy. 
Thirdly, there is substantial variation in bondholder gains depending on whether the takeover is 
domestic or cross-border. All else equal, bidding firm bondholders earn lower returns from cross-




uncertainty and inefficiency associated with the default of internationally diversified firms. However, 
the negative cross-border effect can be counterbalanced by better creditor rights and credit contract 
enforcement in the target country. We find that improved creditor protection induces considerable 
wealth redistributions from shareholders to bondholders. This is an important result, because it shows 
evidence  of  cross-border  spillovers  in  creditor  protection.  The  bondholders  of  UK  bidders  are 
particularly sensitive to such spillovers in cross-border deals, and otherwise do not benefit from purely 
domestic deals at all. To some extent, we find analogous results for target firm bondholders, but the 
target population is small and presents a challenge for future research. 
Our results also provide other interesting additions to the literature. Bidder bondholders earn higher 
returns from acquisitions of unlisted targets. A similar listing effect has been previously documented 
for shareholder returns (Faccio et al., 2006). In acquisitions of listed firms, bidder bondholders benefit 
more when the target firm is relatively small, and are generally perceptive of changes in both asset risk 
and financial risk. Finally, we find that bidder bondholder gains are significantly higher when a tender 
offer is made. The remainder of this paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical 
literature and makes prior conjectures on the drivers of bondholder wealth changes. Section 3 contains 
descriptive statistics on the sample and describes the methodology. Section 4 provides an extensive 
discussion  of  the  empirical  results,  while  Section  5  describes  robustness  checks  and  possible 
extensions. Finally, Section 6 allows for some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Theoretical background and conjectures 
 
2.1. The theory of bondholder wealth in mergers and acquisitions 
 
Finance  theory  suggests  that  mergers  and  acquisitions  can  have  many  different  effects  on 
bondholders. Early studies postulate that bondholders benefit from a co-insurance of cash flows. If two 
firms  with  imperfectly  correlated  cash  flow  streams  merge,  their  combined  cash  flow  volatility 
becomes lower, which reduces default risk and increases debt capacity (Levy and Sarnat, 1970). The 
co-insurance effect is likely to be stronger in diversifying or conglomerate mergers where there is little 
or no  economic  relationship between  the  merging  parties.  Thus, it  is  customarily conjectured  that 
bondholders gain more from diversifying than from non-diversifying M&As. However, diversifying 
mergers tend not to create new wealth because they neither provide operating efficiencies nor increase 
product or factor market power (Berger and Ofek, 1995). Then, any bondholder gains must come from 
mere redistributions of shareholder wealth, whereby an increase in bond prices is accompanied by an 
offsetting reduction in share prices (Higgins and Schall, 1975; Galai and Masulis, 1976). 
Dennis and McConnell (1986) argue that bidding firms may reverse such wealth shifts by financing 
their acquisitions with leverage. Cash offers generally require debt financing because most bidders 
have limited cash and liquid assets (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). Thus, they tend to increase default risk 
in the combined firm as well as reduce the collateral available to bondholders. If the bidder offers 
equity, no assets leave the firm and financial distress costs are reduced. Ultimately, this suggests that 




signalling effects associated with equity financing. In the spirit of Myers and Majluf (1984), DeAngelo 
et al. (1984) point out that the managers of the bidder prefer an equity offer if they believe their firm is 
overvalued. If the market interprets an equity offer as bad news on the firm’s future expected cash 
flows, as Mitchell and Stafford (2000) indeed find, this may also deteriorate bondholder sentiment. 
It is notable that the above conjectures intuitively separate asset risk effects associated with business 
operations  and  financial  risk  effects  associated  with  financing  operations.  From  the  bondholders’ 
perspective, this distinction is formalized by Shastri (1990). The author derives predictions for the risk 
effects of M&As by comparing the pre-merger risk profiles of the bidder and the target. Asset risk in 
the combined firm can differ from the asset risks of the merging parties because they have different 
levels of asset risk to start with, and/or because their unlevered stock returns are imperfectly correlated. 
Overall, a reduction in asset risk increases, while an increase in asset risk decreases bondholder 
wealth. The impact of the asset risk change depends on the size of the risk change, but also on the pre-
merger risk of debt. Thus, relatively risky bonds should benefit the most from a risk reduction, and 
relatively safe bonds should lose the most from a risk increase. 
Shastri (1990) relates financial risk effects specifically to leverage. Obviously, other factors also 
contribute  to  the  risks  associated  with  financing  operations.  For  example,  interest  coverage  better 
captures  the  immediate  probability  of  default.  Whatever  the  measure  used,  financial  risk  in  the 
combined firm will differ from the financial risks of the merging parties unless they are identical pre-
merger. Then, a reduction in financial risk increases, while an increase in financial risk decreases 
bondholder wealth. Of course, this financial risk effect does not account for expected risk changes due 
to post-merger financing operations or as a result of the payment method
1. 
The risk implications of other firm and deal characteristics are not unambiguous. Nonetheless, they 
may still have an indirect impact on credit risk, if only through affecting projected efficiency gains that 
influence the combined firm’s ability to service its fixed debt obligations. A critical problem relates to 
the relative size of the target and the bidder. On one hand, larger targets may induce a greater co-
insurance of cash flows and contribute more assets to the combined firm, which adds debt capacity 
(Hovakimian et al., 2001). On the other, there should be a limit to the absorption capacity of bidding 
firms. Large deals are hard to implement successfully, thus the efficiency gains associated with the 
acquisition of smaller targets should be relatively larger (Bhagat et al., 2005). Target bondholders may 
also gain more when the bidding firm is relatively large, to the extent that large bidders are generally 
more diversified and thus tend to have lower credit risk at a given leverage ratio (Faccio and Masulis, 
2005). 
Wealth creation in M&As has also been linked to the public status of the target firm in recent 
empirical research. Acquisitions of unlisted targets have been shown to generate better returns for 
bidder shareholders, and existing studies have been unable to fully explain why. It is plausible that the 
shareholder gains are driven by limited competition, which may come from the bidder specificity of the 
acquisition  and  increases  the  likelihood  of  underpayment  for  the  target  firm  (Chang,  1998).  Still, 
                                                 
1 Shastri (1990) argues that wealth redistributions may also occur between bidder and target bondholders based 
on  seniority.  Differences  in  debt  maturity  induce  a  seniority effect,  whereby  shorter  maturity  debt  becomes 
effectively senior to longer maturity debt. Then, the holders of shorter maturity bonds should experience a more 
positive wealth effect than do the holders of longer maturity bonds. The available data do not enable us to test 




Faccio et al. (2006) find that the abnormal shareholder gains persist over time and across countries, and 
are  invariant  to  size,  ownership  structure,  industry  focus,  information  leakages  and  the  payment 
method
2. It is also ex ante unclear whether bondholders are affected by the public listing of the target
3. 
The type of and attitude towards a takeover bid are also related to projected synergy levels and the 
disciplining  of  target  management.  Negotiated  deals  are  typically  friendly  and  prescribe  the  co-
operation of the target firm’s incumbent managers. Thus, they are more likely to be driven by hubris, 
but also by managerial empire building aimed at creating large, diversified firms with low risk (Jensen, 
1986). Conversely, tender offers are associated with greater wealth creation, as they bypass target 
management  and  indicate  greater  confidence  in  the  bidder’s  ability  to  realize  efficiency  gains 
(Loughran  and Vijh, 1997)
4. In tender offers, the premium  paid  to the target  shareholders is also 
higher,  especially  when  the  hostility  of  the  bid  leads  to  aggressive  bargaining  (Schwert,  2000). 
Nonetheless, Bhagat et al. (2005) find no evidence that tender offers would induce bidders to overpay 
for target firms. 
 
2.2. Cross-border deals and the impact of regulatory and governance standards 
 
From the perspective of bondholders, cross-border M&As exhibit some distinct peculiarities relative 
to domestic deals. Denis et al. (2002) draw a parallel between global and industrial diversification, and 
observe that the two induce a similar diversification discount in share prices. Accordingly, Moeller and 
Schlingemann  (2005) find  that  US firms  that acquire cross-border  targets achieve  lower abnormal 
stock returns and lesser improvements in operating performance. In the spirit of these findings, the 
implications  of  cross-border  takeovers  for  bondholders  are  two-fold.  On  one  hand,  the  cash  flow 
streams of bidder and target are likely to be less correlated in cross-border deals, thus bondholders 
should benefit – and shareholders lose – from reduced cash flow volatility. On the other, even if the 
projected efficiency gains are considerable, capturing these is complicated. In cross-border M&As, 
informational asymmetries are greater and clashes in corporate culture may occur. Bondholders may 
also suffer directly from the added legal uncertainty and inefficiency associated with the default of an 
internationally diversified firm. Thus, we conjecture that cross-border M&As  accrue lower wealth 
benefits to bondholders than do domestic mergers. 
In cross-border M&As, the relative differences in the regulatory and institutional character of the 
bidder and target countries are of paramount importance. For bondholders, a critical issue relates to 
how creditor rights and their enforcement compare in the national jurisdictions of the merging firms, as 
                                                 
2  Chang  (1998)  compares  equity-financed  acquisitions  of  private  firms  to  private  equity  placements,  where 
monitoring is improved and informational asymmetries are reduced by the emergence of new blockholders (the 
concentrated target owners). Accordingly, the shareholder wealth gains associated with takeovers of private firms 
are highest when an equity offer is made (Fuller et al., 2002; Moeller et al., 2004). Still, the abnormal shareholder 
gains remain even in cash-financed private deals (Faccio et al., 2006). 
3 It is equally difficult to predict how target bondholders are affected by the public status of the bidder. On one 
hand, listed bidders are likely to be larger because of their access to capital markets. Schwert (2000) notes that 
agency problems are also more severe in listed bidders, thus their acquisitions are more likely to be driven by 
empire building. On the other, unlisted bidders may be more reliant on and monitored more closely by individual 
creditors, and their acquisitions are less likely to be driven by managerial hubris. 
4 The choice of acquisition type is also endogenous to other deal characteristics. Martin (1996) observes that 




- in marked contrast with the US where bankruptcy law is federal - insolvency law is still a matter of 
national law even within the EU. La Porta et al. (2000) argue that there are limitations to the functional 
spillover of creditor protection, because corporate assets remain under the jurisdiction of the country 
where they are located. Until 2000, this territoriality principle was indeed the only principle regulating 
the various insolvency regulations in Europe. However, in that year, the European Union (EU) passed 
the European Insolvency Regulation (EIR)
5 in order to enhance co-operation among jurisdictions in 
insolvency  proceedings  and  harmonize  conflict  of  law  issues  (Enriques  and  Gelter,  2006).  As  a 
consequence, the EU has adopted a modified form of universalism, which has one main jurisdiction in 
charge of insolvency proceedings while also still allowing secondary, territorially-based proceedings. 
The  EIR  intends  to identify the principal jurisdiction based on where  the debtor’s  centre of main 
interests (COMI) is located. Unfortunately (and surprisingly), the EIR does not define COMI and the 
preamble to this regulation remains very vague. While in some firms there is little doubt where the 
COMI is located, in larger, internationally diversified firms there may be ambiguity (Franken, 2005)
6. 
While in the US the choice of bankruptcy court is frequently taken by the insolvent corporation, the 
parties petitioning for bankruptcy proceedings in Europe are usually creditors
7. Consequently, cross-
border diversification facilitates insolvency law arbitrage by creditors through jurisdiction (or forum) 
shopping, whereby they may race to choose a supposedly friendly jurisdiction to strengthen their legal 
position and obtain maximum satisfaction for their claims. While the ambiguities in the European 
regulation allow for jurisdiction shopping to the benefit of creditors, it is also possible that the debtor 
pre-empts creditors in filing for bankruptcy under the universalism rule in a national jurisdiction that is 
not to the advantage of creditors. However, when this latter case arises, creditors may open secondary 
or territoriality-based proceedings in jurisdictions other than where the debtor’s centre of main interest 
is located provided that the firm has assets in those countries (Enriques and Gelter, 2006)
 8. 
To conclude, bondholders can clearly benefit from improved creditor protection brought about by 
cross-border M&As for three reasons. Firstly, new exposure to a jurisdiction with better creditor rights 
is likely to force management to avoid excessive risk-taking. Secondly, a cross-border acquisition (of 
substantial foreign operations) may lead to jurisdiction shopping in case of insolvency such that the 
best  possible  law  form  the  perspective  of  the  creditors  may  apply.  Third,  in  case  the  jurisdiction 
adopted does not maximize creditor rights, the creditors could open territoriality-based proceedings 
whereby all creditors (including the ones from the jurisdiction with the worse creditor rights) would 
                                                 
5 European Council Regulation No. 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings. Other international treaties on cross-
border  insolvency  include  the  Nordic  Bankruptcy  Convention  of  1933  and  the  Montevideo  and  Bustamente 
Conventions in force in much of South America (BIS, 2002). 
6  Franken  (2005:  248-254)  points  out  that  COMI  is  ‘a  highly  manipulative  concept  […]  that  leaves  ample 
discretion  for  creative  judicial  interpretation’.  Another  potential  source  of  conflict  is  that  common  law 
jurisdictions determine the applicable insolvency law by the firm’s place of incorporation (the incorporation 
doctrine), while civil law jurisdictions determine the same, by the firm’s head office or “real seat” (the real seat 
doctrine). 
7  Jurisdiction  shopping  by  creditors  is  also  a  well-known  phenomenon  in  US  general  insolvency  law,  and 
explains the popularity of pro-creditor bankruptcy courts in Delaware and New York. The BIS (2002) points out 
that  jurisdiction  shopping  may  be  generally  more  relevant  for  common  law  jurisdictions  that  follow  the 
“incorporation doctrine” than for civil law jurisdictions applying the “real seat doctrine”. 
8 ‘If creditors of an establishment located in another member state have statutory priority rights that do not have 
equivalents  under  the  home-country  law,  they  can  protect  their  priority  position  by  filing  for  a  secondary 




also have a claim on the assets of the country which protects creditor rights’ best. Thus, if a cross-
border takeover allows access to a jurisdiction with better creditor rights (through the principle of 
universalism or territoriality), it induces relatively higher bondholder wealth gains for the bondholders 
in the country with the lower creditor protection. Of course, an improvement in creditor protection is 
also conditional on the general effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary and the enforcement of 
debt contracts.
9 
La Porta et al. (1998) find that countries of a common legal origin bear some resemblance in the 
extent they protect creditor rights. A notable observation is that on average, common law countries 
offer stronger creditor protection than do civil law – especially French civil law – countries. Still, there 
is enormous variation even within particular families of legal origin. For example, English insolvency 
law strictly enforces creditor rights, whereas the softer US approach puts them under judicial discretion 
(Sussman, 2005). La Porta et al. (1998) report similar differences within the French legal family, such 
as between the more pro-creditor Netherlands and more pro-debtor France. 
However, a strong distinction must still be drawn between common and civil law countries from a 
governance perspective. In the common law Anglo-American countries, strong shareholder rights vis-
à-vis managers and stringent disclosure requirements encouraged the emergence of market-oriented 
corporate  governance  systems.  These  regimes  basically  view  creditors  and  other  stakeholders  as 
independent parties that maintain arm’s-length contractual arrangements with the firm (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). In the civil law-based, more stakeholder-oriented governance systems of Continental 
Europe, the dynamics of the firm-creditor relationship are very different. Banks act as concentrated 
lenders and delegated monitors, playing a key role in mitigating informational asymmetries and agency 
problems (Diamond, 1991), and reducing the marginal utility of external market mechanisms. Other 
stakeholders also develop long-term relationships with the firm, and closely-held equity and pyramid-
like group memberships are in place. The greater influence of banks and other risk-averse stakeholders 
on  corporate  decision  making  dictates  that  bondholders  in  the  stakeholder-oriented  governance 
regimes  of  Continental  Europe  benefit  more  from  mergers  and  acquisitions.  Conflicts  of  interest 
cannot be ruled out between senior banks and junior bondholders, especially if bondholder claims are 
unsecured (La Porta et al., 1998). Nonetheless, close bank monitoring should prevent managers from 
excessive risk-taking, which should also make acquisitions more bondholder-friendly. 
The fundamental differences between market- and stakeholder-oriented governance regimes also 
carry paramount importance in cross-border M&As. Existing studies show clear evidence of cross-
border spillovers in governance structures, accounting standards and disclosure practices when a target 
firm adopts the governance system of its foreign bidder or vice versa (Bris and Cabolis, 2002; Goergen 
and Renneboog, 2004; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). The strong influence of creditors is also 
likely to be passed on in cross-border deals, but this will depend on the change in the relative power 
and  monitoring  incentives  of  banks  and  other  stakeholders.  Intuitively,  cross-regime  M&As  may 
import  creditor  influence from  the  perspective  of  one  firm,  but  dilute  creditor  influence from  the 
perspective of another. Thus, the bondholders of a common law firm gain more from a takeover of a 
                                                 
9 In the special cases where the governing law of the debt contract is expressly specified, as is the case with 
Eurobonds, jurisdiction shopping is not directly applicable. Nonetheless, the improved bargaining power of the 
other creditors puts pressure on management to moderate their risk-taking even at the expense of shareholder 








3. Data selection and descriptive statistics 
 
3.1. Data selection 
 
We compile a list of merger announcements from the Mergers and Acquisitions Database of the 
Securities  Data  Corporation  (SDC).  Transactions  classified  as  acquisitions  of  assets  and  minority 
interests are excluded. We require that one of the merging parties (i) be domiciled in Europe, (ii) be 
publicly listed, and (iii) have fixed-rate euro- or sterling-denominated Eurobonds. The sample period 
runs  from  1995  to 2004;  data requirements  for  the construction of  pricing  benchmarks, described 
below, prevent pre-1995 deals being included. Our focus is also confined to investment-grade issuers, 
as the negligible size of the junk-grade Eurobond market prohibits reliable pricing in this segment 
entirely. We exclude all bonds with special features i.e. those that are convertible, callable, puttable or 
subordinated. These features have a strong impact on bond prices and their occurrence is otherwise rare 
among Eurobonds. 
We use Eurobonds for three main reasons. Firstly, they constitute the only European corporate bond 
market that is sufficiently large and liquid to allow for the construction of robust pricing benchmarks. 
Secondly, Eurobonds are much more standardized than are domestic bonds. They are mostly unsecured 
and carry fewer covenants, which international investors often find too costly to enforce. Thus, most 
Eurobonds  are  de facto of high  credit  quality,  because  investors  are  unwilling  to  accept  such  ill-
protected securities from low quality borrowers. Eurobonds are also typically governed by English 
law
10  and  listed  on  the  Luxembourg  Stock  Exchange
11,  which  facilitates  comparability  across 
borrowers of different nationalities. And thirdly, Eurobonds are issued in relatively large amounts, 
typically in bearer form, and are normally exempt from withholding tax
12. This ensures that they are 
held predominantly by institutional investors, which makes the Eurobond market highly liquid and 
competitive, ensuring efficiency and a minimal risk of price anomalies (Gabbi and Sironi, 2005)
13. 
                                                 
10  The  choice  of  governing  law  is  typically  negotiated  between  the  underwriter  and  the  issuer.  UK  law  is 
generally preferred, because the “freedom of contract” principle permits the inclusion of collective action clauses 
in the bond contract, allowing for the timely and orderly renegotiation of contract terms in the event of default. In 
addition, UK law allows greater scope for the bond trustee to negotiate with the issuer, which sits well with 
Eurobond investors who tend to prefer anonymity (Smith and Walter, 1997). 
11 The Luxembourg Stock Exchange was among the first relax Eurobond issuing procedures in 1990. It also has 
major advantages over other exchanges such as low fees, no withholding tax and the quick approval of new 
listings. 
12 Eurobonds are usually exempted from withholding tax if they are publicly available (via a stock exchange 
listing) and are widely distributed. The latter condition requires the bonds to have a modest face value, usually a 
few thousand euro. The average and median size of the Eurobonds contained in the sample are ¼ELOOLRQDQG
¼PLOOLRQUHVSHFWLYHO\ 
13 It is well-known that retail investors often acquire Eurobonds for tax minimization purposes. Still, in some 
countries they are forbidden from holding bearer securities altogether. We do not expect these peculiarities to 




We collect bond prices from the Reuters Fixed Income Database. All prices are dealer quotes, which 
often contain matrix prices that are not separated from actual trade data. Matrix prices are not driven by 
firm-specific  information,  which  makes  our  analysis  less  likely  to  return  significant  results. 
Nonetheless, the high liquidity of Eurobonds should ensure that M&A announcements induce actual 
trades. Bond ratings are obtained from Standard and Poor’s or, when unavailable, Moody’s Investors 
Service.  
Abnormal bond returns are defined as the sum of monthly abnormal returns in the two months 
surrounding the deal announcement (i.e. months -1 and 0) to account for information leakages (Warga 
and Welch, 1993). Consistent with the recent literature, we treat each issuer of multiple Eurobonds as a 
value-weighted portfolio of its bonds, where the weights are based on the market value of each bond 
two  months  before  the  announcement.  When  a  firm  has  both  euro-  and  sterling-denominated 
Eurobonds outstanding, the sterling market value is converted into euro. Abnormal monthly returns are 
computed using a matching portfolio method, described in Appendix 1. We construct 40 reference 
Eurobond portfolios segmented by currency (euro and sterling), credit rating (BBB, A, AA and AAA) 
and duration (1-3, 3-5, 5-7, 7-10 and 10+ years). Each portfolio must contain a minimum of 10 bonds; 
where  this  condition is not satisfied,  we  use one of 20  reserve portfolios  created  in two duration 
categories (1-5 and 5+ years). In the spirit of Kahle et al. (2005), we use duration as an alternative 
criterion to time-to-maturity. Time-to-maturity is customarily used to construct pricing benchmarks (as 
done e.g. by Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers and iBoxx). However, it does not account for coupon 
bias, by assuming that the risk sensitivity of bonds is independent of their coupon payments (Duffee, 
1998). To ensure robustness, we compute both equal- and value-weighted returns on the matching 
portfolios. The value-weighted approach uses weights based on bond market values two months before 
the announcement. Kahle et al. (2005) make a strong argument for the use of equal-weighted portfolios 
over the customarily used value-weighted ones. They report that the value-weighted approach suffers 
more from positive skewness, which leads to a lower rejection region for negative abnormal returns 
and a higher rejection region for positive abnormal returns. We find strong support for this contention, 
but it does not affect the fundamental outcomes of this paper.  
Finally, to identify wealth redistributions between shareholders and bondholders, we also calculate 
abnormal stock returns. Stock price data are collected from Datastream. To ensure direct comparability 
with abnormal bond returns, abnormal stock returns are also defined as the sum of monthly abnormal 
returns in months -1 and 0. Monthly abnormal returns are computed as the monthly raw stock returns 
minus the returns on the benchmark equity index of the issuer’s domicile. 
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, it is useful to determine what constitutes economically 
significant abnormal returns. Brown and Warner (1980) set the economic significance of abnormal 
stock returns at 1%, or about one-sixth of the historical yearly stock market risk premium. Kahle et al. 
(2005) argue that given the lower market risk premium that bonds earn relative to shares, abnormal 
bond returns should be lower. The authors infer that if the typical bond earns a risk premium of 1.75% 
per  year,  abnormal  bond  returns  exceeding  0.25%  should  already  be  regarded  as  economically 
significant. Given that the risk premium demanded on high quality Eurobonds is equally low, we can 
adopt a similar threshold for economic significance.  




3.2. Descriptive statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics on the sample are provided in Table 1. Accounting data are obtained from 
Worldscope  and  are  measured  at  the  fiscal  year-end  preceding  the  M&A  announcement.  Market 
capitalization and the book value of assets are expressed in 2004 prices using the appropriate consumer 
price index and, where applicable, converted into euro. Return on assets (ROA), asset risk, leverage, 
and interest coverage are defined in Appendix 1. In the spirit of Billett et al. (2004), we also compute 
these firm-level variables for the combined firm (not shown in Table 1). The combined asset risk is 
defined is the portfolio standard deviation of unlevered bidder and target returns, where the weights are 
based on the market value of assets (the sum of the book value of assets and market capitalization). 
The combined leverage ratio uses weights based on the market value of assets. Finally, the combined 
interest coverage is weighted by the book value of debt. 
 
(Insert Table 1) 
 
Panels A and B of Table 1 report descriptive statistics for the full sample and the largest balanced 
sample, respectively. The full sample contains a total of 238 deals where abnormal bond returns are 
available for either the bidder or the target. In Panel A, we report accounting data for 236 bidders and 
77 targets. This reflects the fact that most target firms and two bidding firms are unlisted. Panel B 
shows that accounting data are available for 75 pairs of merging firms, but only for 15 pairs do we 
have both accounting data and abnormal bond returns. 
Bidding firms are substantially larger than their targets both by market capitalization and the book 
value of assets. In the balanced sample shown in Panel B, the book value of assets of the typical bidder 
is ¼ELOOLRQZKLOHWKDWRIWKHWDUJHWLV¼ELOOLRQ%LGGHUVDOVRDSSHDUWREHPRUHPDWXUHWRWKH
extent that they are more profitable, more levered and have lower asset risk than their respective target 
firms. The interest coverage ratios of bidders and targets are not statistically different. The data suggest 
that several bidders and targets are financially distressed. Nonetheless, none of them are in bankruptcy 
at the time of M&A announcements. The 15 takeovers for which abnormal bond returns are available 
for both merging parties are giant deals by all standards. In this subsample, the typical bidder is rated 
A+ and has an asset value of ¼.9 billion, while the typical target firm is rated A and has an asset 
value of ¼ELOOLRQ7KHUHLVQRHYLGHQFHWKDWWKHVHELGGHUVZRXOGEHPRUHOHYHUHGWKDQWKHLUWDUJHWV
but they are more profitable and have lower asset risk. The typical bidding and target firms have two 
bonds each, with a remaining maturity of 5.5 years and 7.1 years, respectively. 
Though not reported in Table 1, the vast majority of the M&A announcements occur towards the 
end of our sample period. In total, 45 deals were announced before 2001, 70 in 2001-2002 and 123 in 
2003-2004. This corresponds to the recent rapid rise of corporate bond issuance across Europe over the 
past decade. An overview of bidder and target countries by region and legal origin are provided in 
Appendix 2. The legal origin of each country is identified by Djankov et al. (2004). Panel A describes 
the mergers where abnormal bond returns are available for the bidding firms. Of the 225 bidders, 79 
are UK firms, while the rest are domiciled in Continental Europe, mainly in French and German civil 




spillovers of governance structures. Of the 225 deals, 145 are cross-border, and only in 52 cases are the 
bidder and target countries of the same legal origin. UK bidders tend to approach target firms in French 
civil law countries such as France, Spain and the Netherlands. Civil law bidders are more active in the 
German civil law countries of Central and Eastern Europe such as Poland and the Czech Republic. In 
Panel B, the 24 European target firms with abnormal bond returns are all approached by bidders from 
developed European countries. Of the 24 deals, 12 are cross-border, and in seven cases UK target firms 
are approached by French or German civil law bidders. 
 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1. Abnormal security returns around M&A announcements 
 
Table 2 provides a simple overview of how the various security holders fare in European mergers 
and acquisitions. Panel A shows that in bidding firms, bondholders earn substantial positive abnormal 
returns in the two months surrounding M&A announcements. The gains are economically significant 
and are highly robust across all specifications: the mean abnormal bond return is 0.56% (0.52%) over 
the  equal-  (value-)  weighted  benchmarks,  and  the  median  is  0.81%  (0.71%).  This  is  a  striking 
departure from existing US evidence, which typically documents no or negative changes in the wealth 
of bidder bondholders. Overall, the results imply that European bidding firms make creditor-friendly 
bids that lead to reduced risk in the combined firm. The fact that we only consider investment-grade 
bidders does not make these results any less remarkable. For US deals, Billett et al. (2004) report 
significant bondholder losses regardless of the bidder’s credit rating. Moreover, Shastri (1990) argues 
that safe debt benefits relatively less from a risk reduction. This suggests that the bondholder gains 
induced by takeover bids should be even higher in junk-grade than in investment-grade bidders. 
 
(Insert Table 2) 
 
The shareholders of European bidders do not incur statistically significant wealth benefits from 
M&A announcements, though the mean and median abnormal stock returns are positive at 0.78% and 
0.34%,  respectively.  Similar  results  are  reported  for  Europe  by  Campa  and  Hernando  (2004)  and 
Goergen and Renneboog (2004), and for the US by Maquieira et al. (1998), Mulherin and Boone 
(2000) and Schwert (2000). Still, there is some evidence of overall wealth creation in bidding firms. 
Panel A approximates changes in total firm value by combining abnormal bond and stock returns
14. 
The  mean  combined abnormal  return  is 0.70% (0.69%) when  the  equal- (weighted-) bond pricing 
benchmarks  are  used,  and  the  median  is  0.34%  (0.26%).  Notably,  the  t-tests  of  the  means  are 
insignificant, but the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests are significant at the 10% level. This 
                                                 
14 To approximate the changes in total firm value, we weight abnormal bond and stock returns with the book 
value of long-term debt and market capitalization. Billett et al. (2004) point out that the use of long-term debt 
implicitly assumes that the abnormal returns of the firm’s short-term debt and debt-like instruments are zero. This 
should not affect the results materially, as short claims are inherently less sensitive to changes in the underlying 




suggests that M&As do tend to create value in bidding firms, but the bulk of new wealth is captured by 
the firms’ creditors in the form of reduced default risk. 
The abnormal security returns of target firms are reported in Panel B of Table 2. Target bondholders 
do not reap statistically significant wealth benefits from M&A announcements, although the results 
may be economically significant (as defined by Kahle et al., 2005). The mean abnormal bond return is 
0.62% (0.58%) and the median is 0.33% (0.22%) over the equal- (value-) weighted benchmarks. The 
insignificance of these results may well be due to the small number of observations in the sample. 
Nonetheless, our findings are not dissimilar to existing US evidence that the co-insurance benefits of 
M&As  are  negligible  for  the  bondholders  of  creditworthy  target  firms.  Billett  et  al.  (2004)  show 
significant abnormal bond losses in investment-grade targets, while other studies report insignificant 
abnormal returns (Asquith and Kim, 1982; Dennis and McConnell, 1986; Walker, 1994; Maquieira et 
al., 1998). Predictably, the shareholders of target firms still realize sizeable wealth gains. The abnormal 
target stock returns are large and highly significant, with the mean and median at 12.40% and 9.55%, 
respectively. There is an equally substantial increase in the combined value of targets. This indicates 
that target shareholders compel bidders to pay out much of the expected wealth gains associated with 
the deal, and is fully consistent with earlier results reported for both Europe and the US (Martynova 
and Renneboog, 2006a; Mulherin and Boone, 2000). 
The remainder of this section provides a detailed analysis of bondholder wealth changes in both 
bidding and target firms. Henceforth for the sake of brevity, we only show the abnormal bond returns 
obtained  using  the  equal-weighted  pricing  benchmarks.  The  results  using  the  value-weighted 
benchmark  portfolios  are  available  on  request.  In  order  to  identify  wealth  transfers  between 
bondholders and shareholders, we also report the abnormal stock returns in some of the subsequent 
tables. 
 
4.2. Bidding firm abnormal bond returns around M&A announcements 
 
4.2.1. Analysis of bidder abnormal security returns 
A. The impact of deal characteristics. The abnormal security returns of bidding firms are stratified 
across a number of criteria in Table 3. Panel A illustrates the impact of deal characteristics, and first 
examines whether a conglomerate effect is present. Following Berger and Ofek (1995), we define 
M&As as diversifying or conglomerate when the two-digit SIC codes of the bidder and the target are 
different. Contrary to our prior conjecture, bidder bondholders do not benefit more from diversifying 
deals. In both diversifying and non-diversifying M&As, the abnormal bond returns are significantly 
different from zero, and are comparable in size at 0.58% and 0.55%, respectively. This suggests that 
bondholders  benefit  both  from  greater  co-insurance  in  diversifying  deals  and  greater  operating 
synergies in non-diversifying deals. Abnormal stock returns are also unaffected by the industry focus 
of the deal, thus there is no direct evidence of wealth redistributions in the way that Galai and Masulis 
(1976) propose. It is notable that for the US, Billett et al. (2004) and Maquieira et al. (1998) also report 
no evidence of a conglomerate effect. In fact, Maquieira et al. (1998) find quite the reverse for pure 
stock-for-stock deals; they show that bidder abnormal bond returns are insignificant in diversifying 





(Insert Table 3) 
 
Panel A also refutes the conjecture that equity-financed acquisitions induce greater wealth benefits 
for the bondholders of the bidder. In fact, cash offers are associated with a higher mean abnormal bond 
return  than  are  equity  or  mixed  offers  (though  the  difference  in  the  means  is  insignificant).  This 
suggests that bondholders are also sensitive to the agency and signalling implications of equity issues. 
For US firms, Billett et al. (2004) report similar results, while Travlos (1987) finds that the negative 
effects of equity financing outright dominate. Shareholder wealth changes are also not driven expressly 
by the payment method. The mean abnormal stock return is consistently lower when equity financing 
is used, but the differences in the means associated with the alternative payment methods are never 
significant. 
An important contribution of this paper is that it examines whether bondholder wealth changes are 
subject  to  a  listing  effect.  If  acquisitions  of  private  firms  induce  greater  wealth  gains  for  the 
shareholders of bidding firms, as Faccio et al. (2006) confirm, bondholders may also benefit indirectly. 
Panel  A  shows  only  marginal  evidence  in  this  regard.  Both  bondholders  and  shareholders  earn 
significant abnormal gains when the target firm is privately held. When the target is publicly listed, 
abnormal bond returns are lower but still significant, while abnormal stock returns are insignificantly 
negative. The differences in means and medians are insignificant in both cases, although the difference 
in the means of abnormal stock returns becomes significant when only domestic deals are considered. 
In acquisitions of listed firms, the form of the takeover bid has a pronounced impact on the wealth of 
bidder bondholders. When a tender offer is made, the mean abnormal bond return is highly significant 
at 0.75%. Conversely,  negotiated deals have no discernible  impact on bondholder wealth, and the 
difference in the mean returns associated with the two deals types is statistically significant. To some 
extent, this may owe to the fact that tender offers are typically financed with cash and directed at 
smaller, less levered target firms. It is nonetheless striking that for the US, Billett et al. (2004) report a 
negative rather than a positive effect of tender offers on bondholder wealth. The authors document a 
similar negative relationship between bondholder wealth and hostile offers. The results in Panel A do 
not support this finding for Europe. However, our sample comprises only five hostile bids, which is 
expected  given  the  high  degree  of  ownership  concentration  of  Continental  European  firms.  We 
nonetheless confirm that bidder shareholders suffer substantial wealth losses when a hostile bid is 
made. The mean abnormal stock return amounts to -14.14%, which suggests that hostile bidders tend to 
overpay for target firms. To some extent, non-hostile but competitive tender offers also run the risk of 
overpayment. Accordingly, the mean abnormal stock return is also lower when a tender offer is made 
(but the mean difference relative to negotiated deals is statistically insignificant). 
Finally, Panel A considers the impact of two more deal characteristics on security returns. Firstly, 
there is no evidence that the wealth gains accrued to bidder bondholders vary over time. Notably, 
abnormal bond returns are comparable before and after 2000, which marked the end of the European 
M&A  wave  and  the  introduction  of  the  European  Insolvency  Regulation  in  the  European  Union. 
Shareholder wealth changes are insignificantly negative until 2000 and significantly positive thereafter. 




overpay for target firms. Secondly, both abnormal bond and stock returns are unaffected by whether 
the deal is later completed. Though not reported in Panel A, the reason for non-completion has no 
impact either; non-completion may arise when the offer is rejected or withdrawn, or when the bidder 
acquires a toehold but does not proceed to take full control. 
 
B. The impact of relative firm characteristics. Panel B illustrates how the pre-merger characteristics of 
bidding and target firms affect bidder security holders in acquisitions of listed target firms. We first 
stratify the sample by whether the ratio of the target and bidder market capitalization is greater than the 
sample median. The results lend strong statistical evidence to a negative size effect on abnormal bond 
returns. When the target firm is relatively small, the mean abnormal bond return is 0.85%. Conversely, 
when the target is relatively large, abnormal bond returns are both insignificant and negligible in size. 
Remarkably, Panel B suggests that abnormal stock returns are also lower when the target is relatively 
large, but the mean difference is statistically insignificant. Though not reported here, this is attributable 
to the fact that the size effect holds for domestic but not for cross-border deals. 
In  the  spirit  of  Shastri  (1990),  we  illustrate  next  how  bidder  security  holders  are  affected  by 
differences in the risk profiles of bidding and target firms. We first consider the impact of changes in 
asset risk. Abnormal security returns are partitioned by whether the combined portfolio of bidder and 
target has higher or lower asset volatility that the pre-merger bidder. The results confirm our conjecture 
that bondholder wealth is strongly affected by asset risk changes. When asset risk is reduced in the 
combined firm, the mean abnormal bond return is significantly positive at 0.74%. When asset risk is 
increased, the mean abnormal return turns insignificantly negative, and the difference in the means is 
significant at the 5% level. Billett et al. (2004) report comparable but considerably weaker results for 
investment-grade US bidders. It is notable that shareholders also appear to respond negatively rather 
than positively to increased asset risk. 
In  Panel  B,  financial  risk  changes  only  have  a  marginal  impact  on  bondholder  wealth.  When 
leverage is lower or interest coverage is higher in the combined firm, the mean abnormal bond return is 
highly  significant.  Conversely,  when  the  combined  leverage  is  higher  or  the  combined  interest 
coverage  is  lower,  the  mean  return  is  negligible.  The  differences  in  the  means  are  significant 
economically but fall marginally short of being significant statistically. Predictably, increased financial 
risk seems to have a positive rather than a negative effect on abnormal stock returns, but the mean 
differences are again insignificant. It is notable that Billett et al. (2004) also fail to find a significant 
financial risk effect. The authors point out that this type of analysis does not account for a change in 
financial risk post-merger or as a result of the merger itself. We find strong support for this argument 
(not reported in the table). Before the announcement date, the combined leverage of the merging firms 
is 0.28 on average, but it rises to 0.38 in the fiscal year after the deal’s completion.  
Panel B finally partitions the sample by the credit rating of the bidder relative to that of the target. 
Credit ratings proxy for the overall default probability and thus jointly capture both asset and financial 
risks. Bidder bondholders do seem to respond to the relative rating of the target firm. The results show 
that the mean abnormal bond return is 0.56% when the target is rated at least as high as the bidder, but 
only 0.03% when it is rated lower. The bondholder returns are even more divergent when median 




abnormal stock returns reduced considerably when the target is rated relatively high. Unfortunately, 
none  of  mean  differences  are  significant  owing  to  the  small  sample  size  of  just  21  observations. 
Nonetheless, these patterns are consistent with the conflict of shareholder and bondholder interests 
with respect to risk-taking, and lend support to our earlier results. 
 
4.2.2. Bidder abnormal bond returns in domestic and cross-border acquisitions 
A. The impact of deal and firm characteristics. Table 4 documents some major differences in the 
response of bidder bondholders to domestic and cross-border M&As. A first important finding is that 
bondholders  reap  statistically  significant  abnormal  wealth  benefits  from  both  domestic  and  cross-
border deals. However, there is some evidence that the cross-border abnormal bondholder gains are 
slightly lower. The difference in the mean abnormal bond returns, at 0.84% and 0.41%, respectively, is 
only marginally insignificant, while the Wilcoxon rank-sum test is in fact significant at the 10% level. 
These findings lend some support to our conjecture that bondholders do not respond well to the greater 
informational  asymmetries  and  legal  uncertainties  and  inefficiencies  associated  with  cross-border 
deals. 
 
(Insert Table 4) 
 
The remainder of Table 4 compares the drivers of bidder bondholder wealth in domestic versus 
cross-border M&As. Domestic and cross-border abnormal bond returns are individually partitioned by 
deal and firm characteristics in Panels A and B, respectively. For the sake of brevity, we only report 
those  results  where  notable  differences  emerge.  For  example,  we  do  not  show  the  impact  of  the 
payment method, the type and attitude of the deal, and the relative size of the bidder and the target. 
Panel A shows that the lack of a conglomerate effect persists for both domestic and cross-border 
M&As. However, it is notable that the difference between domestic and cross-border abnormal returns 
is only significant when the deal is non-conglomerate and when the target firm is privately held. This 
suggests  that  bidder  bondholders  are  more  concerned  about  the  uncertainties  of  cross-border 
acquisitions when operational synergies are to be realized, and when informational asymmetries are 
greater. It is also interesting that only after 2000 do bondholders benefit relatively less from cross-
border deals. 
The  risk  sensitivity  of  bidder  bondholders  also  differs  somewhat  in  domestic  and  cross-border 
M&As. Panel B shows that in cross-border deals, bondholders are highly sensitive to asset risk, but not 
to  financial  risk  measured  by  leverage  or  interest  coverage.  This  may  suggest  that  under  greater 
asymmetric  information,  bondholders  discount  the  informativeness  of  such  accounting-based  risk 
measures. In domestic deals, bond returns respond equally to changes in asset risk and financial risk. 
The mean differences depicted in the panel fall marginally short of being significant, but this may be 
attributed to the limited sample size. 
 
B. Creditor protection spillovers in cross-border acquisitions. We have conjectured in Section 2.2 that 
cross-border M&As induce considerable spillovers in the regulatory and institutional standards that 




creditor protection in the bidder and target countries. Each of these variables is described in detail in 
Panel C of Appendix 2. Firstly, we use the creditor rights protection index developed by Martynova 
and Renneboog  (2006b) using information  collected from more  than 150  academic and practicing 
corporate  lawyers  located  in  31  European  countries  and  the  US.  The  authors  gather  detailed 
information on changes in creditor rights regulation which have taken place by country over the past 15 
years. Consequently, their creditor rights index, which is based on the index constructed by La Porta et 
al. (1998), has the advantage of being available for each year between 1990 and 2005 and for more 
European countries
15. Secondly, the efficiency of claims disputes resolution is measured by the credit 
contract enforcement index of Djankov et al. (2004). This variable is defined as the number of days 
needed to resolve a payment dispute through courts, and is measured in 129 countries at January 2003. 
Thirdly,  we  use  the  corporate  transparency  index  of  Martynova  and  Renneboog  (2006b),  also 
constructed using the same international network mentioned above and available on a yearly basis, to 
measure the general quality of information available to corporate investors. And fourthly, we use a 
general rule of law index constructed by the World Bank. This variable aggregates several indicators 
that measure the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, the enforceability of contracts and the 
incidence of crime. It is available bi-yearly from 1996 onwards for 209 countries
16. 
Table 5 partitions abnormal bond returns by the relative scores of target and bidder countries in each 
of the four governance variables. Abnormal stock returns are also reported in order to identify potential 
wealth  shifts  between bondholders  and  shareholders.  The first key  result  is  that bondholders only 
benefit from cross-border M&As when the deal provides access to a jurisdiction with better creditor 
rights. The table shows that the mean abnormal bond return is highly significant when creditor rights 
are better in the target country and insignificant otherwise. The mean difference of 0.66% is highly 
significant both statistically and economically, which confirms that creditor rights spillovers do occur 
in cross-border M&As. 
 
(Insert Table 5) 
 
Improvements in the efficiency of credit contract enforcement have a similar but more muted impact 
on bidder bondholder wealth. The mean difference in abnormal bond returns is lower and marginally 
insignificant, but the rank-sum test is significant at the 10% level. What is more interesting is that the 
better enforcement of credit contracts also induces a statistically significant reduction in shareholder 
wealth. Table 5 shows that abnormal stock returns are positive when enforcement is poorer in the 
target country, but they turn insignificantly negative when it is better. This suggests that improved 
enforcement  redistributes  wealth  from  shareholders  to  bondholders  by  reducing  the  tolerance  of 
creditors for unserviced debt claims and by decreasing the probability that shareholders retain some 
value in insolvent firms in countries with a more creditor-oriented insolvency jurisdiction. Otherwise, 
                                                 
15 The index by La Porta et al. (1998) is not available for countries in Central and Eastern Europe and is static 
(constructed for 1995).  
16 The World Bank publishes six governance indicators: rule of law, voice and accountability, political stability 
and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and control of corruption. These indices 
are all highly correlated, thus we only include the rule of law index in our analysis. We have recomputed all our 




neither bondholders nor shareholders seem to respond to the general conditions of the institutional 
environment.  Table  5  suggests  that  abnormal  bond  returns  are  insensitive  to  the  relative  level  of 
corporate transparency and rule of law in the target country. There is some indication that bidder 
shareholders incur relatively higher wealth gains when the rule of law is improved, but none of the 
results are significant statistically. 
 
4.2.3. Bidder abnormal bond returns: the impact of the legal and governance regime 
We now examine the impact of the legal origin in the spirit of the conjectures proposed in Section 
2.2. We distinguish between common law and civil law countries, which crudely proxies for market- 
and stakeholder-oriented governance systems, respectively. For bidder countries, this reduces to a mere 
distinction between the UK and Continental Europe, because all bidders are European and none are 
from Ireland. Within the family of civil law countries, a distinction of French, German and Nordic civil 
law traditions does not change the results. 
Table  6  first  partitions  bidder  abnormal  bond  returns  by  the  bidder’s  domicile:  a  civil  law 
Continental European country or the common law UK. The initial results show that bidder bondholders 
incur substantial wealth gains in both cases. Abnormal bond returns are highly significant in both 
Continental  Europe  and  the  UK  at  0.48%  and  0.71%,  respectively,  and  the  mean  difference  is 
statistically  insignificant.  This  does  not  support  our  prior  conjecture  that  Continental  European 
bondholders should benefit more from M&As. 
 
(Insert Table 6) 
 
However, the further stratification of the sample reveals considerable differences in the drivers of 
abnormal returns in Continental Europe and the UK. The differential impact of governance standards is 
illustrated in Panel A. The first remarkable finding is that the abnormal bondholder gains are driven by 
domestic deals in Continental Europe and by cross-border deals in the UK. There is some evidence that 
Continental European bondholders gain both from domestic and cross-border M&As. However, the 
cross-border  abnormal  bond  returns  are  substantially  lower,  by  0.94%  on  average.  The  patterns 
observed  for  UK  bidders  are  strikingly  different.  The  cross-border  abnormal  bond  returns  are 
considerable, and are significantly higher than those reported for Continental Europe. In contrast, UK 
domestic  deals do not accrue  significant  gains to  bidder bondholders. The difference between the 
domestic and cross-border abnormal bond returns is insignificant. Still, the absence of abnormal bond 
gains  in  domestic  deals  corresponds  well  to  the  empirical  evidence  reported  for  the  US,  another 
market-oriented governance regime rooted in the common law tradition. 
The lower cross-border returns in Continental Europe are likely to be motivated by governance 
concerns.  In  stakeholder-oriented  governance  regimes,  creditors  and  other  stakeholders  enjoy 
considerable authority vis-à-vis the firm, and a cross-border acquisition may deteriorate their strong 
domestic position. This may induce greater agency costs of debt, which could be amplified further if 
the target regime is market-oriented (Köke and Renneboog, 2005). Panel A provides some support for 
this argument. In Continental Europe, cross-border abnormal bond returns are positive when the target 




difference in the mean abnormal returns is marginally insignificant, but the number of cross-regime 
deals is relatively small. 
In cross-border acquisitions by UK bidders, the legal regime of the target country has no discernible 
impact on bondholder wealth. Rather, bondholders respond specifically to an improvement in creditor 
rights. Panel A shows that the mean abnormal bond return is extremely high (2.33%) when creditor 
rights are better in the target country, but it is negligible (0.09%) otherwise. Interestingly, Continental 
European  bondholders  do  not  respond  materially  to  creditor  rights  differences,  though  the  mean 
abnormal return is again higher when the target country offers better protection. 
The bondholders of UK bidders also react more to firm and deal characteristics. Panel B illustrates 
that abnormal bond returns in the UK, but not in Continental Europe, are subject to a negative listing 
effect and are significantly higher when a tender offer is made. UK bondholders are also more sensitive 
to risk considerations. Panel C shows that abnormal bond returns respond to asset risk changes in both 
the UK and Continental Europe. However, the response of UK bondholders is considerably stronger. 
When asset risk in the combined firm is greater, the relative reduction in the mean abnormal bond 
return is 3.00% in the UK and 0.97% in Continental Europe. Moreover, only UK bondholders seem to 
be  responsive  to  changes  in  financial  risk.  The  panel  shows  that  UK  abnormal  bond  returns  are 
significantly lower when interest coverage is reduced in the combined firm, and the negative impact of 
increased leverage is only marginally insignificant. The same financial risk effects appear to be of little 
concern to the bondholders of Continental European bidders. This may be attributable to the better 
representation of creditor interests in these firms. In stakeholder-oriented governance regimes, banks 
and other risk-averse stakeholders have a strong influence on capital structure decisions, which may 
prevent the firm from exacerbating financial risk. 
 
4.2.4. Multivariate analysis of bidder abnormal security returns 
To substantiate our univariate findings, we now perform a multivariate analysis of abnormal security 
returns in bidding firms. Table 7 shows the results of three pairs of regressions on abnormal bond and 
stock returns in the two months surrounding M&A announcements. In the models, we use a variety of 
independent variables to jointly test for the effects of governance, deal and firm characteristics. Each 
independent variable is an indicator variable which equals one if the variable description holds and 
zero otherwise. As before, the abnormal stock returns are included to help identify wealth transfers 
between shareholders and bondholders. The coefficient estimates are compared in each pair of bond 
and stock regressions using a Wald test. 
 
(Insert Table 7) 
 
The  three  pairs  of  regressions  serve  different  purposes.  Model  (1)  incorporates  only  those 
independent variables that are available for acquisitions of both private and listed companies. This 
specification  is  designed  to  maximize  the  number  of  observations  in  the  regressions
17.  Model  (2) 
                                                 
17 We do not test for relative firm characteristics (size and asset and financial risk effects), as the accounting data 
of some bidding and target firms are lacking. The model also does not control for the payment method, as it is 




jointly tests the full set of independent variables for acquisitions of listed firms. Finally, Model (3) 
draws on Model (2), but excludes some of the insignificant variables to maximize the joint significance 
of the bond regression. We verify the absence of omitted variables using the Ramsay RESET test. The 
indicator variable that captures the relative level of creditor rights in the bidder and target countries is 
included in all three models. The models do not test for the target country’s legal origin and country-
level  corporate  transparency.  The  inclusion  of  these  generates  multicollinearity  problems  in  the 
regressions,  and  they  neither  contribute  meaningfully  nor  have  an  impact  on  abnormal  returns  in 
alternative specifications
18. 
In each regression shown in Table 7, we arrange the independent variables by whether they capture 
governance, deal or firm characteristics. A first key finding is that all else equal, bidder bondholders 
benefit  considerably  less  from  cross-border  than  from  domestic  M&As.  The  relative  reduction  in 
abnormal bond returns is economically significant in all three specifications, varying between 1.12% in 
Model (1) and 2.10% in Model (3). This supports our prior conjecture that bondholders do not respond 
well  to the added risks associated with  cross-border deals.  It  also  reinforces the earlier univariate 
results that were similar but considerably weaker. There is equally strong evidence that at least in 
acquisitions  of  listed  firms,  bidder  bondholders  earn  substantially  lower  gains  in  the  UK  than  in 
Continental Europe. In Model (1), the coefficient is insignificant on the dummy that captures whether 
the  bidder  country  is  common  law  (i.e.  the  UK).  However,  it  becomes  highly  significant  when 
acquisitions of private firms are excluded in Models (2) and (3). As has been mentioned, including the 
target country’s legal origin in the regressions does not change this result, and the coefficient on the 
target country dummy is always insignificant. 
Table  7  confirms  that  bidder  bondholders  benefit  more  from  cross-border  deals  where  creditor 
protection  is  better  in  the  target  country.  The  coefficient  on  the  creditor  rights  dummy  is  highly 
significant in all three specifications. In Model (3) it is also significantly different from the coefficient 
in the stock regression, which is (insignificantly) negative. We interpret this as marginal evidence that 
improved  creditor  rights  vis-à-vis  the  firm  redistribute  wealth  from  shareholders  to  bondholders. 
Contrary to the univariate results, there is no statistical evidence for a similar wealth shift when credit 
contracts are more efficiently enforced in the target country. Still, in the bond regressions of Models 
(2)  and  (3)  the  coefficient  on  the  enforcement  dummy  is  highly  significant.  This  suggests  that 
bondholders do respond favorably to improved enforcement. The relative level of rule of law has no 
discernible impact on abnormal bond returns. 
Of  the  deal  characteristics,  two stand  out  as being  significant drivers  of  the  changes  in  bidder 
bondholder wealth. Firstly, Model (1) shows strong evidence of a negative listing effect; when the 
target firm is publicly listed, abnormal bond returns are lower by 1.18%. However, the results do not 
confirm that acquisitions of listed targets would accrue lower benefits to shareholders. Secondly, all 
three models indicate that tender offers benefit bondholders more than do negotiated deals. When a 
tender offer is made, abnormal bond returns are higher by between 1.30% in Model (1) and 1.50% in 
Model (2). The other deal characteristics have no discernible impact on bondholder wealth changes. 
Notably,  abnormal  bond  returns  are  unaffected  by  whether  the deal  is  diversifying,  financed with 
                                                 
18 We test for multicollinearity using variance inflation factors (VIF), tolerance and condition indices. In the 




equity, or hostile.  They are also invariant  to whether  the deal  is announced after 2000 or is later 
completed. Abnormal stock returns do not respond to any of these deal characteristics either except 
deal attitude, which corresponds to the univariate findings in Section 4.2.1. 
Finally,  Models  (2)  and  (3)  illustrate  for  acquisitions  of  listed  targets  how  the  merging  firms’ 
relative characteristics affect abnormal bond returns in the bidding firm. Consistent with the univariate 
results, the size effect is fully confirmed in the multivariate regressions. When the relative market 
capitalization of target and bidder is higher than the sample median, abnormal bond returns are reduced 
significantly,  by  1.66%.  Bondholders  are  also  sensitive  to  both  asset  risk  and  financial  risk 
considerations. The asset risk dummy is marginally insignificant in Model (2) but turns significant in 
Model (3). In this specification, abnormal bond returns are lower by 1.14% when asset risk is greater in 
the combined firm than in the pre-merger bidder. Interestingly, shareholder wealth also decreases in 
asset risk, confirming the earlier univariate findings. Of the financial risk indicators, changes in interest 
coverage have an economically significant impact on bondholder wealth. When the combined interest 
coverage is higher, abnormal bond returns increase by 1.78% in Model (2) and 1.51% in Model (3). On 
the other hand, the relative level of combined leverage has no discernible impact. This result holds 
irrespective of whether we include the interest coverage dummy in the regressions, and may indicate 
that interest coverage better captures the immediate concerns of bidder bondholders over financial risk. 
 
4.3. Target firm abnormal bond returns around M&A announcements 
 
This section extends the analysis of security holder wealth changes to target firms. Regrettably, the 
small sample size of just 24 observations does not allow the same exhaustive investigation of target 
abnormal bond and stock returns. We still resort to performing the multivariate regressions described 
in Section 4.2.4 and report the results in Appendix 3. As before, the appendix contains three pairs of 
bond and stock regressions. Model (1) only includes those independent variables that are available for 
the full set of observations. It does not examine the effect of the bidder’s public status either due to 
multicollinearity  issues
19.  Model  (2)  jointly  tests  for  the  impact  of  governance,  deal  and  firm 
characteristics  for  the  acquisitions  where  the  bidding  firm  is  publicly  listed.  Still,  it  does  not 
incorporate the full set of independent variables, including the payment method, to maintain degrees of 
freedom and to avoid multicollinearity. Finally, Model (3) maximizes the joint significance of the bond 
regression by excluding some of the insignificant independent variables. As before, the absence of 
omitted variables is verified using the Ramsay RESET test. The models do not test for the acquirer 
country’s  legal origin  and  country-level  corporate transparency; neither  variable has  an impact on 
abnormal returns and they create multicollinearity problems in the regressions. 
Appendix 3 shows only marginal evidence that target abnormal bond returns are affected by the 
deal’s  geographical  focus.  The  coefficient  on  the  cross-border  dummy  is  negative  in  all  three 
specifications, but it is only significant in Model (2). There is stronger indication in Model (3) that 
target abnormal bond returns are lower in the common law UK than in civil law Continental European 
countries. This coincides both with our prior conjecture and the respective result for bidding firms. 
                                                 
19  Only  two  unlisted  bidders,  one  government-owned  and  one  subsidiary,  appear  in  the  sample,  and  the 




Model (3) also confirms that in cross-border deals, weaker creditor rights in the bidder country lead to 
lower target abnormal bond returns. The relative efficiency of credit contract enforcement has no such 
impact, even when the creditor rights dummy is excluded from the regressions. Somewhat surprisingly, 
target bondholders reap consistently higher wealth gains when the rule of law is better in their home 
country. Abnormal stock returns are largely insensitive to each of these governance conditions. 
For the deal characteristics, Model (3) shows marginal evidence that target abnormal bond returns 
are lower when a tender offer is made. This result is inconsistent with our earlier findings for bidding 
firms, although it is not robust to the inclusion of the hostility dummy which otherwise has no effect 
and is thus excluded in Model (3). Shareholder wealth gains are significantly higher when a tender 
offer is made. This is expected, as tender offers are made directly to the target shareholders and can 
thus induce intense price competition for the shares of the target firm. 
Finally, Models (2) and (3) illustrate the impact of the relative characteristics of bidding and target 
firms. Target bondholders do not respond to the relative size of target and bidder in the way that bidder 
bondholders do. However, target abnormal bond returns are equally affected by changes in asset risk. 
Model (2) indicates that the wealth gains of target shareholders also decrease in asset risk; Billett et al. 
(2004) report a similar, albeit marginally insignificant, result for the US. There is no evidence that 
target abnormal bond returns are negatively affected by an increase in financial risk. In Model (2), the 
coefficient  on  the  interest  coverage  dummy  has  the  correct  sign  but  is  statistically  insignificant. 
Surprisingly,  target  bondholders  respond  positively  to  an  increase  in  leverage,  while  target 
shareholders respond negatively (Model 3).  
 
 
5. Robustness checks and extensions 
 
We perform a variety of robustness checks to ensure the validity of the above results. The separate 
investigation  of  euro-  and  sterling-denominated  Eurobonds  suffers  from  sample  size  issues  and 
otherwise  does  not  yield  materially  different  results.  Our  findings  are  also  robust  to  alternative 
specifications of the deal- and firm-level variables. Beginning with the payment method, distinguishing 
pure stock-for-stock M&As rather than (partially) equity-financed deals makes no difference to the 
empirical findings. Similarly, the results are essentially identical when we use the book value of assets 
rather than market capitalization to measure the relative size of bidding and target firms. Replacing the 
firm-level dummies with the actual variables yields qualitatively similar results. 
We also investigate whether long leverage has a stronger impact on bondholder wealth than does 
total leverage, which incorporates both short- and long-term liabilities. Bondholders should respond 
more to long leverage, because their claims are not directly affected by the servicing of short-term 
liabilities. We define long leverage as the book value of long-term debt divided by the sum of the book 
value of long-term debt and market capitalization. The results show that a change in long leverage does 
have  an  effect  on  the  bondholders  of  UK  bidders.  However,  it  has  no  impact  on  bondholders  in 
Continental  Europe,  who  seem  to  be  generally  insensitive  to  financial  risk  changes.  Using  long 




We try several alternative specifications of the governance variables used throughout the paper. 
While Martynova and Renneboog’s (2006b) creditor rights index draws on the index created by La 
Porta  et  al.  (1998),  it  includes  an  additional  regulatory  provision  on  whether  creditor  approval  is 
required  to  initiate  bankruptcy  proceedings  (see  Panel  C  of  Appendix  1).  When  we  remove  this 
additional provision from the index and repeat the analysis, practically the same results are obtained. 
We also replace Martynova and Renneboog’s (2006b) corporate transparency index and the World 
Bank’s rule of law index by the indicators created by La Porta et al. (1998) on accounting standards, 
judicial  efficiency  and  rule  of  law.  Each  of  these  indices  is  statistically  insignificantly  related  to 
abnormal bond returns. Of course, a problem with these indices is that they neither capture regulatory 
changes over time nor are they available for Central and Eastern European countries. 
As another alternative to the corporate transparency index, we introduce a firm-level dummy in the 
regressions  that  captures whether  a  firm  has  issued  American  Depository  Receipts  (ADR). ADRs 
prescribe  compliance  with  US  accounting  standards  and  are  typically  associated  with  improved 
disclosure. The dummy has no impact on changes in bondholder wealth. Also, we have noted earlier 
that  the  World  Bank  publishes  six  governance  indicators:  rule  of  law,  voice  and  accountability, 
political  stability,  government  effectiveness,  regulatory  quality  and  control  of  corruption.  A 
recalculation of the results with these alternative indices does not yield material differences. 
Finally, we also perform multivariate regressions that maximize the joint significance of the stock 
rather than the bond regressions. In these models, we include two additional dummy variables that 
capture cross-country differences in Martynova and Renneboog’s (2006b) indices of shareholder rights 
and  minority  shareholder  protection  (which  were  also  constructed  using  the  international  network 
specified  in  Appendix  3).  We  find  that  shareholder  wealth  changes  are  positively  affected  by  an 
improvement in the protection of minority shareholders vis-à-vis incumbent shareholders but not in 
shareholder protection vis-à-vis management. Bondholder wealth changes are unaffected by each of 
these variables across all specifications, and the wealth redistribution effects previously identified also 





This paper makes an important contribution to the comparative corporate governance literature by 
investigating for the first time the bondholder wealth effects of European M&As. Existing studies have 
focused on US domestic deals only and shown very limited evidence that either bidding or target firm 
bondholders would benefit from M&As at all (Eger, 1983; Maquieira et al., 1998; Billett et al., 2004). 
More importantly, no attempt has been made to demonstrate how bondholder wealth changes may 
differ in cross-border takeovers, across governance systems or as a result of cross-border spillovers in 
creditor protection. Similar issues have been a hot topic in recent academic research and have been 
investigated extensively for changes in shareholder wealth (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005, for the 
US and Goergen and Renneboog, 2004, for Europe). 
 





We  show  that  each of  these  factors  has  a  fundamental  impact on  bondholder  wealth  based on 
investment-grade Eurobonds (we summarize the conjectures and the economic effects in Table 8). 
Firstly, we find that M&As involving European firms are considerably more bondholder-friendly than 
are US domestic deals. The wealth benefits accrued to bidding firm bondholders are economically 
substantial and statistically significant (with a mean of 0.56% and a median of 0.81%), while in target 
firms abnormal returns are positive but insignificant. Secondly, bondholder gains in both bidding and 
target  firms  are  systematically  higher  in  M&As  that  involve  Continental  European  firms.  This  is 
consistent with the better representation of creditor interests in stakeholder- relative to market-oriented 
governance regimes. And thirdly, bidding firm abnormal bond returns are lower in cross-border deals. 
However,  this  is  counterbalanced  by  wealth  redistributions  from  shareholders  to  bondholders  if 
creditor rights and the efficiency of credit contract enforcement are better in the target country. This is 
a key result because it shows for the first time that creditor protection spillovers change the relative 
riskiness of security classes. To some extent, we find similar results for target firm bondholders, but 
our target sample is small and presents a challenge for future research. 
These  findings  ultimately  show  that  cross-country  differences  in  creditor  rights  and  the 
representation  of  creditor  interests  cannot  be  discounted.  The  interactions  between  market-  and 
stakeholder-oriented regimes have considerable economic implications, and this has as much an impact 
on  bondholders  as  it  does  on  shareholders  in  cross-border  M&As.  Our  results  also  provide  other 
interesting additions to the existing literature. We show that bidder bondholders earn considerably 
lower, but still significant, abnormal returns when the target firm is publicly listed. A similar listing 
effect has already been reported for the shareholders of bidding firms in the existing literature. In 
acquisitions of listed firms, bidder bondholders benefit more when the target firm is relatively small 
and when a tender offer is made. Finally, bondholders respond strongly to the changes M&As induce 
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Variable  descriptions  are  provided  in  Panel  B  of  Appendix  1.  Bond ratings  are  obtained  from  Standard  and  Poor’s  or,  when  unavailable,  Moody’s.  The  ratings are 
cardinalized i.e BBB-=1, BBB=2, BBB+=3,…,AAA=10. 
 
   
   
Panel A: Unbalanced sample of all firms  Panel B: Data available for both bidders and targets 
    N  Mean  Median  Std. dev.  Min.  Max.    N  Mean  Median  Std. dev.  Min.  Max. 
     




Market capitalization (millions of 2004 euro)    236  20,217  9,399  35,449  865  335,284   75  24,509  9,373  48,319  864,549  335,284 
Assets (millions of 2004 euro)    236  27,949  12,407  39,950  953  246,959   75  24,351  15,689  33,086  1,572  230,385 
Return on assets    236  7.6%  7.1%  6.5%  -22.2%  33.6%   75  7.9%  7.6%  7.4%  -22.2%  27.2% 
Leverage    236  0.31  0.30  0.16  0.01  0.86   75  0.28  0.25  0.16  0.01  0.69 
Interest coverage    236  5.9  4.0  15.2  -21.3  224.5   75  8.2  4.1  25.9  -5.9  224.5 
Asset risk (std. dev. of unlevered stock returns)    236  0.06  0.06  0.03  0.02  0.17   75  0.07  0.06  0.03  0.02  0.13 
Number of bonds per firm    225  2.76  2  2.39  1  16   15  2.47  2  1.6  1  6 
Bond maturity (years remaining)    225  6.60  5.88  3.42  1.48  21.38   15  6.67  5.45  4.00  3.11  15.79 
Bond duration (years)    225  5.14  4.93  1.93  1.41  12.07   15  5.01  4.62  2.00  2.78  9.73 
Bond rating    225  4.35  4  2.01  1  10   15  6.47  6  2.07  4  10 
     




Market capitalization (millions of 2004 euro)    77  6,122  1,053  16,723  13  118,343   75  5,301  964  15,117  13  118,343 
Assets (millions of 2004 euro)    77  4,557  1,489  7,347  16  36,768   75  4,475  1,480  7,405  16  36,768 
Return on assets    77  4.9%  8.4%  17.4%  -75.7%  35.0%   75  4.5%  8.3%  17.5%  -75.7%  35.0% 
Leverage    77  0.23  0.20  0.18  0.00  0.65   75  0.23  0.21  0.18  0.00  0.65 
Interest coverage    77  35.7  4.3  361.5  -805.6  3,054.0   75  36.3  4.3  366.4  -805.6  3,054.0 
Asset risk (std. dev. of unlevered stock returns)    77  0.09  0.08  0.08  0.02  0.51   75  0.10  0.08  0.08  0.02  0.51 
Number of bonds per firm    24  2  2  0.98  1  4   15  2  2  1.07  1  4 
Bond maturity (years remaining)    24  8.22  6.82  4.67  2.98  22.44   15  7.96  7.11  3.76  2.98  13.92 
Bond duration    24  5.74  5.54  1.97  2.77  9.88   15  5.69  5.57  1.72  2.81  8.39 





Bidding and target firm abnormal security returns around M&A announcements 
 
Abnormal returns are in % and are described in Panel A of Appendix 1. Variable descriptions are provided in 
Panel B of Appendix 1. Combined returns are computed as weighted averages, where the bond weights are 
based on the book value of long-term debt and the equity weights on market capitalization at the fiscal year-
end preceding the announcement. Where applicable, the weights are converted into euro. The significance 








Mean  Statistic  Median  Statistic  N 
Panel A: Bidding firms 
Equal  0.56  4.21
a  0.81  5.93
a  225  Abnormal bond return 
Value  0.52  3.91
a  0.71  5.34
a  225 
Abnormal stock return  0.78  1.16  0.34  1.32  225 
Equal  0.70  1.36  0.34  1.76
c  225  Combined abnormal bond and stock return 
Value  0.69  1.34  0.26  1.74
c  225 
Panel B: Target firms 
Equal  0.62  0.96  0.33  1.00  24  Abnormal bond return 
Value  0.58  0.91  0.22  0.83  24 
Abnormal stock return  12.40  3.47
a  9.55  2.86
a  24 
Equal  10.23  3.62
a  6.15  2.94
a  24  Combined abnormal bond and stock return 
Value  10.24  3.62
a  6.16  2.60
a  24 
 





Bidder abnormal security returns around M&A announcements 
 
Abnormal returns are in % and are described in Panel A of Appendix 1. Abnormal bond returns are computed using equal-
weighted  pricing  benchmarks;  results  using  value-weighted  benchmarks  are  available  on  request.  Variable  descriptions  are 
provided in Panel B of Appendix 1. The difference in means t-test assumes unequal variances across groups when a test of equal 
variances is rejected at the 10% level. The significance level of medians and differences in medians are based on Wilcoxon 
signed-ranks and rank-sum tests, respectively. a, b and c denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Deal characteristics 
  Bonds    Stocks    Grouping criteria 
  Mean  Median    Mean  Median   
N 
Same two-digit SIC code    0.55
a  0.8
a    0.49  -0.23    152 
Different two-digit SIC code    0.58
b  0.82
a    1.39  0.78    73  Industry focus 
Difference     0.04  0.02     0.90  1.01       
Cash only    0.61
a  0.85
a    0.79  0.92    142 
Equity or mix    0.34  0.16    -1.86  -2.55    23  Payment method 
Difference     -0.28  -0.69     -2.65  -3.47       
Unlisted    0.65
a  0.85
a    1.43
b  0.77
c    149 
Listed    0.39
c  0.66
a    -0.49  -2.08    76 
Target firm’s 
public status 
Difference    -0.26  -0.20    -1.92  -2.85     
Negotiated deal    -0.06  0.39    0.86  0.12    34 
Tender offer    0.75
b  0.99
a    -1.58  -3.19    42 
Deal type in 
acquisitions of 
listed firms  Difference     0.81
c  0.60     -2.43  -3.31       
Friendly    0.36  0.64
b    0.47  -1.80    71 
Hostile    0.73  1.78    -14.14
c  -6.38
c    5 
Deal attitude in 
acquisitions of 
listed firms  Difference     0.37  1.14     -14.61
b  -4.58
b       
1995-2000    0.58  0.34
c    -2.41  -2.89    38 
2001-2004    0.55
a  0.85
a    1.43
b  0.78
b    187 
Date of 
announcement 
Difference     -0.03  0.51     3.84
b  3.68
c       
Not completed    0.61
a  0.85
a    0.73  -0.09    68 
Completed    0.53
a  0.77
a    0.81  0.62    157  Deal status 
Difference     -0.08  -0.09     0.07  0.71       
 
Panel B: Firm characteristics in acquisitions of listed firms 
  Bonds    Stocks    Grouping criteria 
  Mean  Median    Mean  Median   
N 
Smaller or equal to sample median    0.85
b  0.99
a    0.18  0.06    36 
Larger than sample median    -0.07  0.15    -1.26  -3.63    35 
Relative size of 
target to bidder 
Difference     -0.93
b  -0.84
c     -1.43  -3.69       
Lower in combined firm than in bidder    0.74
a  0.76
a    0.99  1.91    51 
Higher in combined firm than in bidder    -0.71  0.02    -4.14  -3.63    17  Asset risk 
Difference     -1.45
b  -0.74
c     -5.13  -5.54       
Lower in combined firm than in bidder    0.59
b  0.68
a    -2.17  -3.58    44 
Higher in combined firm than in bidder    0.07  0.56    2.14  1.91    27  Leverage 
Difference     -0.51  -0.12     4.31  5.49       
Higher in combined firm than in bidder    0.66
b  0.67
b    -0.60  -2.55    37 
Lower in combined firm than in bidder    0.11  0.58    -0.45  -0.03    34  Interest coverage 
Difference     -0.54  -0.08     0.15  2.52       
Bidder rated lower or equal to target    0.56  1.72    -6.93  -4.43
c    5 
Bidder rated higher than target    0.03  0.12    -1.04  3.10    16  Bond rating 
Difference     -0.53  -1.60     5.88  7.52       
 





Bidding firm abnormal bond returns around domestic and cross-border M&A announcements 
 
Abnormal bond returns are in % and are described in Panel A of Appendix 1. They are computed using equal-weighted pricing benchmarks; results 
using value-weighted benchmarks are available on request. Variable descriptions are provided in Panel B of Appendix 1. The difference in means t-test 
assumes unequal variances across groups when a test of equal variances is rejected at the 10% level. The significance level of medians and differences 
in medians are based on Wilcoxon signed-ranks and rank-sum tests, respectively. a, b and c denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Domestic M&As    Cross-border M&As    Difference  Grouping criteria 
   Mean   Median  N     Mean  Median  N     Mean  Median 
Abnormal bond returns    0.84
a  0.91
a  79    0.41
b  0.77
a  146    -0.43  -0.13
c 
Panel A: Deal characteristics 
Same two-digit SIC code     0.85
a  0.94
a  52     0.39
b  0.72
a  100     -0.46  -0.22
c 
Different two-digit SIC code    0.83
b  0.87
a  27    0.44  0.81
a  46    -0.39  -0.06  Industry focus 
Difference     -0.02  -0.07        0.05  0.09             
Unlisted    1.04
a  0.94
a  46    0.47
b  0.82
a  103    -0.57  -0.12
c 
Listed    0.56  0.56
b  33    0.26  0.69  43    -0.30  0.13 
Target firm’s 
public status 
Difference    -0.48  -0.38      -0.21  -0.13         
1995-2000     0.48  0.15  17     0.67  0.45
c  21     0.19  0.30 
2001-2004    0.94
a  0.94
a  62    0.36
b  0.79





Difference     0.47  0.79        -0.31  0.34             
Panel B: Firm characteristics in acquisitions of listed firms 
Smaller in combined firm than in bidder     0.81
b  0.61
b  25     0.67
b  0.78
b  26     -0.13  0.17 
Greater in combined firm than in bidder    -0.52  -0.16  6    -0.82  0.02  11    -0.30  0.18  Asset risk 
Difference     -1.32  -0.77        -1.49
b  -0.76
c             
Smaller in combined firm than in bidder     0.95
b  0.85
c  20     0.29  0.68  24     -0.67  -0.17 
Greater in combined firm than in bidder    -0.16  0.49  12    0.26  0.71  15    0.41  0.22  Leverage 
Difference     -1.11  -0.36        -0.03  0.03             
Greater in combined firm than in bidder    0.99
b  1.41
c  17    0.37  0.65  20    -0.62  -0.76 
Smaller in combined firm than in bidder    0.03  0.42  15    0.18  0.76  19    0.16  0.34  Interest coverage 
Difference     -0.96  -0.99        -0.19  0.11             





The impact of the regulatory and governance environment on bidding firm abnormal security returns 
around cross-border M&A announcements 
 
Abnormal returns are in % and are described in Panel A of Appendix 1. Abnormal bond returns are 
computed  using  equal-weighted  pricing  benchmarks;  results  using  value-weighted  benchmarks  are 
available on request. Variable descriptions are provided in Panel C of Appendix 1. The difference in 
means t-test assumes unequal variances across groups when a test of equal variances is rejected at the 
10%  level.  The  significance  level  of  medians  and  differences  in  medians  are  based  on  Wilcoxon 




  Bonds    Stocks    Grouping Criteria 
   Mean  Median     Mean  Median    
N 
Target country scores better than bidder country in: 
No     0.12  0.60     0.55  0.56     70 
Yes    0.88
a  1.08
a    -0.02  -0.72    37  Creditor rights 
Difference     0.77
c  0.48
c     -0.58  -1.28       
No    0.22  0.66
b    2.20
b  2.35
b    89 
Yes    0.72
b  0.86
a    -0.82  -1.43    53 
Credit contract 
enforcement 
Difference    0.50  0.20
c    -3.03
c  -3.78
c     
No     0.43
c  0.79
b     0.48  0.34     73 
Yes    0.28  0.79
c    0.08  -0.87    34 
Corporate 
transparency 
Difference     -0.15  0.00     -0.41  -1.21       
No     0.42
b  0.75
a     0.65  0.96     114 
Yes    0.36  0.79
b    1.78  3.97    32  Rule of law 
Difference     -0.06  0.04     1.13  2.81       
 





The impact of legal origin on bidding firm abnormal bond returns around M&A announcements 
 
Abnormal bond returns are in % and are described in Panel A of Appendix 1. They are computed using equal-weighted pricing benchmarks; results using 
value-weighted benchmarks are available on request. Variable descriptions are provided in Panels B and C of Appendix 1. The difference in means t-test 
assumes unequal variances across groups when a test of equal variances is rejected at the 10% level. The significance level of medians and differences in 
medians are based on Wilcoxon signed-ranks and rank-sum tests, respectively. a, b and c denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
 
      Bidder is civil law    Bidder is common law    Difference 
      Mean  Median  N    Mean  Median  N    Mean  Median 
Abnormal bond returns    0.48
a  0.81
a  146    0.71
a  0.81
a  79    0.23  0.00 
Panel A: Governance characteristics 
Domestic     1.12
a  1.12
a  46     0.45  0.61  33     -0.68  -0.81 
Cross-border    0.18  0.69
b  100    0.89
a  1.05
a  46    0.71
b  0.36
b  Geographical focus 
Difference     -0.94
a  -0.43
a        0.45  0.44             
Civil law    0.31  0.69
a  83    0.92
b  1.05
a  32    0.61  0.36 
Common law    -0.45  0.47  17    0.84  1.05
c  14    1.29  0.58 
Legal regime of 
target country 
in cross-border deals  Difference    -0.76  -0.22      -0.08  0.00         
Worse in target country     0.13  0.66  49     0.09  0.53  21     -0.04  -0.13 
Better in target country    0.42  0.80
b  28    2.33
a  1.96




in cross-border deals 
Difference     0.29  0.14        2.24
b  1.43
a             
Panel B: Deal characteristics 
Unlisted     0.43
b  0.79  107     1.19
a  1.21
a  42     0.75
b  0.42
b 
Listed    0.60
b  0.83  39    0.16  0.88  37    -0.44  0.05 
Target firm’s 
public status 
Difference     0.17  0.04        -1.02
b  -1.04
b             
Negotiated deal    0.46  0.76  21    -0.89  -0.08  13    -1.36
c  -0.84
c 
Tender offer    0.76
c  0.99
a  18    0.74
c  0.66  24    -0.03  -0.33 
Deal type in 
acquisitions of listed 
firms  Difference    0.30  0.23      1.63
b  0.74
c         
Panel C: Firm characteristics in acquisitions of listed firms 
Smaller in combined firm than in bidder     0.98
a  1.02
a  23     0.54  0.43  28     -0.45  -0.59 
Greater in combined firm than in bidder    0.02  0.39  12    -2.46
b  -1.61
c  5    -2.48
c  -2.00
c  Asset risk 
Difference     -0.97
c  -0.63        -3.00
a  -2.04
b             
Smaller in combined firm than in bidder     0.64  1.02
b  21     0.55  0.25  23     -0.09  -0.77 
Greater in combined firm than in bidder    0.68
c  0.71
c  15    -0.68  0.01  12    -1.35  -0.70  Leverage 
Difference     0.04  -0.31        -1.23  -0.24             
Greater in combined firm than in bidder    0.53  1.01  16    0.75  0.30  21    0.21  -0.71 
Smaller in combined firm than in bidder    0.75
b  0.79
a  20    -0.79  -0.05  14    -1.54
b  -0.84  Interest coverage 
Difference    -0.22  0.22      1.54





Multivariate regressions explaining bidding firm abnormal security returns  
 
The dependent variable is the abnormal bond or stock return depending on the specification. Abnormal returns are in % 
and  are  described  in  Panel  A  of  Appendix  1.  Abnormal  bond  returns  are  computed  using  equal-weighted  pricing 
benchmarks; results using value-weighted benchmarks are available on request. Each independent variable is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the description holds and zero otherwise. Variable descriptions are provided in Panels B and C of 
Appendix  1.  T-statistics  in  parentheses  use  standard  errors  adjusted  with  the  White  (1980)  correction  for 
heteroskedasticity. Variance inflation factors (VIF), tolerance, and condition indices are diagnostic measures testing for 
multicollinearity. Beta coefficients are compared in each pair of bond and stock regressions using a Wald F-test. a, b and c 
denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Model 1    Model 2    Model 3 
  
Dependent 
dummy variables  Bonds  Stocks 
F-test 
   Bonds  Stocks 
F-test 
   Bonds  Stocks 
F-test 
-1.12  -0.76  (0.03)     -1.62  4.19  (0.48)     -2.10  7.95  (2.18)  Cross-border deal 
(-2.89)
a  (-0.38)      (-1.88)
c  (0.51)      (-2.97)
a  (1.16)   
-0.31  -2.56  (1.3)    -1.90  -6.55  (0.61)    -2.09  -5.27  (0.32)  Bidder is common law 
(-0.74)  (-1.25)      (-2.98)
a  (-1.13)      (-3.48)
a  (-0.88)   
1.00  -1.32  (1.05)    2.28  -10.99  (2.41)    2.13  -10.90  (3.05)
c  Creditor rights 
     better in target country  (2.36)
b  (-0.58)      (2.61)
b  (-1.40)      (2.81)
a  (-1.34)   
0.71  -0.21  (0.15)    2.02  -1.61  (0.15)    2.63  -5.84  (1.11)  Credit contract enforcement 
     better in target country  (1.29)  (-0.08)      (2.22)
b  (-0.16)      (3.17)
a  (-0.62)   









































Rule of law 
     better in target country  (-0.59)  (0.66)        (-0.60)  (0.55)                
-0.21  -0.93  (0.16)    0.94  -0.53  (0.05)          Diversifying deal 
(-0.58)  (-0.51)      (1.00)  (-0.07)           
        0.42  -3.78  (0.45)    0.36  -4.30  -0.68  Equity or mixed financing 
        (0.56)  (-0.67)      -0.53  (-0.85)   
-1.18  0.94  (0.92)                  Target is publicly listed 
(-2.78)
a  (0.40)                   
1.3  -2.53  (2.12)    1.50  -2.99  (0.60)    1.36  -6.45  (2.83)
c  Tender offer 
(2.50)
b  (-0.82)      (2.15)
b  (-0.63)      (2.44)
b  (-1.41)   
-0.02  -13.33  (7.17
a)    0.97  -14.41  (3.20)
c          Hostile bid 
(-0.02)
  (-1.79)
c      (1.10)  (-1.44)           
-0.09  2.02  (1.03)    0.32  3.32  (0.28)          Announcement after 2000 
(-0.20)  (0.80)      (0.44)  (0.70)           




































(0.27)  (0.33)      (-0.19)  (-0.46)           
            -1.67  3.21  (0.70)     -1.66  0.70  (0.22)  Relative size target/bidder > 
     > sample median          (-2.20)
b  (0.58)      (-2.52)
b  (0.14)   
        -1.07  -8.32  (1.60)    -1.14  -10.62  (3.20)
c  Asset risk combined > 
     > asset risk bidder          (-1.63)  (-1.46)      (-2.00)
c  (-1.85)
c   
        0.23  3.85  (0.43)          Leverage combined > 
     > leverage bidder              (0.36)  (0.80)                



































Interest coverage combined > 
     > interest coverage bidder          (2.47)
b  (-0.27)      (2.56)
b  (-0.61)   
1.25  0.62      0.08  5.37      0.95  10.41    Intercept 
(2.18)
b  (0.21)      (0.06)  (0.67)      (1.38)  (1.53)   
Adjusted R
2  0.04  0.03        0.27  -0.04        0.33  -0.01    
F-test  1.77
c  0.96      2.26
b  0.73      3.81
a  0.90   
No. of observations  185      53      53   
Mean VIF  1.47      1.96      1.68   
Maximum VIF  1.91      3.90      2.62   
Minimum tolerance  0.53      0.26      0.38   





Summary of economic effects on abnormal bond returns 
 
This table summarizes the economic effects of the independent dummy variables in the regressions 
shown in Table 7 and Appendix 3 and discussed in Sections 4.2.4 and 4.3. In the regressions, the 
dependent variables are the abnormal bond returns, described in Panel A of Appendix 1. The abnormal 
bond returns are computed using equal-weighted pricing benchmarks; the results using value-weighted 
benchmarks are available on request. Each independent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
description  holds  and  zero  otherwise.  Variable  descriptions  are  provided  in  Panels  B  and  C  of 
Appendix 1.  
 
Bidding firms  Target firms 








Ref: Mean abnormal bond return    0.56%
    0.62% 
Governance characteristics 
Cross-border deal  -  -2.10%  -  0 
Bidder is common law  -  -2.09%     
Target is common law      -  -3.11% 
Creditor rights better in target country  +  2.13%  -  -7.80% 
Credit contract enforcement better in target country  +  2.63%  -  0 
Rule of law better in target country  +  0  -  7.56% 
Corporate transparency better in target country  +  0   -  0  
Risk-related deal and firm characteristics 
Diversifying deal  +  0  +  0 
Equity or mixed financing  +  0  +  0 
Asset risk greater in combined firm  -  -1.14%  -  -8.62% 
Leverage greater in combined firm  -  0  -  6.08% 
Interest coverage lower in combined firm  -  -1.51%  -  0 
Other deal and firm characteristics 
Relative size of target/bidder greater than median    -1.66%    0 
Target is publicly listed    -1.18%     
Bidder is publicly listed        0 
Tender offer    1.36%    0 
Hostile bid    0    0 
Announcement after 2000    0    0 
Completed deal    0    0 





Description of the variables 
 
Panel A: Abnormal bond and stock returns 
   
Abnormal bond returns  The  sum  of  the  monthly  abnormal  returns  in  the  two  months  [-1,0]  surrounding  M&A 
announcements. Monthly abnormal returns are computed as the bond’s return minus the return on a 
matched equal- (value-) weighted benchmark. Each of the 40 equal- (value-) weighted benchmarks 
is segmented by currency (euro or sterling), bond rating (BBB, A, AA or AAA) and duration (1-3, 3-
5, 5-7 and 10+ years). Bond ratings are from Standard and Poor’s or, when unavailable, Moody’s 
Investor  Service.  Where  the  benchmark  contains  less  than  10  bonds,  we  use  one  of  20  reserve 
benchmarks constructed in two duration categories (1-5 and 5+ years). Value-weighted benchmarks 
are constructed using weights based on bond market values.  Firms with multiple bonds are treated 
as value-weighted portfolios, where the weights are the market value of each outstanding bond issue 
two months before the deal announcement. Source: Reuters Fixed Income Database. 
   
Abnormal stock share 
returns 
The  sum  of  the  monthly  abnormal  returns  in  the  two  months  [-1,0]  surrounding  M&A 
announcements. Monthly abnormal returns are computed as the raw stock return corrected for return 
on the benchmark equity index of the issuer’s domicile. Source: Datastream. 
   
Panel B: Firm-level variables 
   
Asset risk  The standard deviation of unlevered stock returns. Unlevered stock returns are defined as the product 
of stock returns and (1 – leverage). The standard deviation of unlevered stock returns is computed 
over months -25 to -2 (and a minimum of 10 months of return data need to be available). In the 
combined firm, it is defined as the portfolio standard deviation of unlevered bidder and target stock 
returns. In each portfolio, the weights are the market value of assets, measured at the fiscal year-end 
preceding the deal announcement and converted into euro where applicable. Source: Datastream and 
Worldscope. 
   
Interest coverage  Earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) divided by interest expense on debt less interest capitalized. 
In the combined firm, it is calculated using weights based on the book value of debt, which is 
converted  into  euro  where  applicable.  It  is  measured  at  the  fiscal  year-end  preceding  the  deal 
announcement. Source: Worldscope. 
   
Leverage  The book value of total debt divided by the market value of assets (the sum of the book value of total 
debt and market capitalization). Leverage in the combined firm is calculated using weights based on 
the market value of assets, converted into euro where applicable. It is measured at the fiscal year-end 
preceding the deal announcement. Source: Worldscope. 
   
Relative size of the 
target and bidder 
The market capitalization of the target firm divided by the market capitalization of the bidding firm. 
It is measured at the fiscal year-end preceding the deal announcement and converted into euro where 
applicable. Source: Worldscope. 
   
Return on assets (ROA) EBIT divided by the book value of assets. ROA in the combined firm is calculated using weights 
based on the book value of assets, converted into euro where applicable. It is measured at the fiscal 
year-end preceding the deal announcement. Source: Worldscope. 





Panel C: Governance variables 







This variable captures regulatory provisions that allow creditors to force repayment more easily, take 
possession  of  collateral  or  gain  control  in  financial  distress.  It  is  part  of  a  corporate  regulation 
database constructed by Martynova and Renneboog (2006b) with the help of 150 corporate lawyers, 
and is available yearly between 1990-2004 for 31 European countries and the US. The regulatory 
provisions are quantified as follows: 
· Debtor-oriented versus creditor-oriented code: 1 if no reorganization option (liquidation only), 0 if 
reorganization + liquidation option; 
· Automatic stay on the assets: 1 if automatic stay is obliged in reorganization (if debt-oriented 
code) or liquidation procedure (if liquidation code), 0 if no automatic stay; 
· Secured creditors are ranked first: 1 if secured creditors are ranked first in the reorganization 
procedure (if debtor-oriented code) or liquidation procedure (if liquidation code), 0 if government 
and employees are ranked first; 
· Creditor approval  of  bankruptcy: 1 if creditor approval is required to initiate a reorganization 
procedure (if debtor-oriented code) or liquidation procedure (if liquidation code), 0 otherwise; 
· Appointment of official to manage reorganization/liquidation procedure: 1 if it is required by law 
in a reorganization procedure (if debtor-oriented code) or a liquidation procedure (if liquidation 
code), 0 otherwise. 
   
Credit contract 
enforcement (days) 
This variable measures the efficiency of claims disputes resolution through courts, and is obtained 
from Djankov et al. (2004). It is defined as the number of calendar days needed to enforce a contract 
of unpaid debt worth 50% of a country’s GDP per capita, and is measured in 129 countries at 
January 2003. 








This variable measures the quality of information available to investors about the firm, its ownership 
structure and management. It is part of a corporate regulation database constructed by Martynova 
and Renneboog (2006b) with the help of 150 corporate lawyers, and is available yearly between 
1990-2004 for 31 European countries and the US. The regulatory provisions are quantified as: 
· Disclosure of managerial compensation: 0 if not required, 1 if required on aggregate basis, 2 if 
required on individual basis; 
· Disclosure of transactions between management and company: 2 if required, 0 if not 
· Disclosure of large ownership stakes: 0 if not required or the minimum requirement is 25% or 
more, 1 if between 10% and 25%, 2 if between 5% and 10%, 3 if less than 5%; 
· Frequency of financial reports per year: 0 if once, 1 if twice, 2 if more than twice; 
· Comply or explain rule: 1 if the requirement is present, 0 otherwise. 
   
Legal origin  A dummy variable that identifies the legal origin of each country. The five origins are English, 
French, German, Nordic and Socialist. Source: Djankov et al. (2004). 
   
Rule of law (Max=5)  This  variable aggregates  several indicators  that  measure  how  well  agents  abide  by  the  rules  of 
society. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of 
the judiciary and the enforceability of contracts. It is published by the World Bank, and is available 
bi-yearly from 1996 onwards for 209 countries. 
 
 
Sources of Martynova and Renneboog’s (2006b) creditor rights protection and corporate transparency indices: 
 
Austria: Prof. Dr. Susanne Kalls (University of Klagenfurt), Prof. Dr. Christian Nowotny and Mr. Stefan Fida (Vienna 
University  of  Economics  and  Business  Administration);  Belgium:  Prof.  Dr.  Eddy  Wymeersch  (University  of  Ghent, 
Chairman of the Commission for Finance, Banking and Assurance), Prof. Dr. Christoph Van der Elst (University of Ghent); 
Bulgaria:  Dr. Plamen  Tchipev (Institute of Economics,  Bulgarian Academy of Sciences), Ms.  Tania Bouzeva (ALIENA 
Consult Ltd., Sofia), Dr. Ivaylo Nikolov (Centre for Economic Development, Sofia); Croatia: Dr. Domagoj Racic and Mr. 
Josip Stajfer (The Institute of Economics, Zagreb0U$QGUHM*DORJDåDZagreb Stock Exchange3URI'U'UDJRýHQJLü
(IVO  PILAR  Institute  of  Social  Sciences),  Prof.  Dr.  Edita  Culinovic-Herc  (University  of  Rijeka);  Cyprus:  Mr.  Marios 
Clerides (Chairman) and Ms. Christiana Vovidou (Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission); Czech Republic: Prof. Dr. 




Kotáb  and  Prof.  Dr.  Milan  Bakes  (Charles  University  of  Prague),  Dr.  Stanislav  Myslil  (ýHUPiN +R HMã 0\VOLO D VSRO
Lawyers and Patent Attorneys), Dr. Jan Bárta (Institute of State and Law, The Academy of Science of Czech Republic), Ms. 
Jana Klirova  (Corporate Governance Consulting, Prague); Denmark: Prof. Dr. Jesper Lau Hansen and Prof. Dr. Ulrik 
Rammeskow Bang-Pedersen (University of Copenhagen); Estonia: Prof. Dr. Andres Vutt  (University of Tartu), Mr. Toomas 
Luhaaar, Mr. Peeter Lepik, and Ms Katri Paas (Law Office of Lepik & Luhaäär); Finland: Prof. Dr. Matti J. Sillanpää (Turku 
School  of  Economics  and  Business  Administration),  Mr.  Ingalill  Aspholm    (Rahoitustarkastus/Financial  Supervision 
Authority), Ms Ari-Pekka Saanio  (Borenius & Kemppinen, Attorneys at Law, Helsinki), Ms Johan Aalto (Hannes Snellman, 
Attorneys at Law; Helsinki); France: Prof. Dr. Alain Couret  (Université Paris I- Panthéon-Sorbonne), Ms. Joëlle Simon 
(MEDEF - French Business Confederation), Prof. Dr. Benoit Le Bars (MC Université de Cergy-Pontoise), Prof. Dr. Alain 
Pietrancosta (Universities of Tours and Paris I- Panthéon-Sorbonne), Prof. Dr. Viviane de Beaufort (ESSEC-MBA), Prof. Dr. 
Gerard  Charreaux  (Université  de  Bourgogne  Pôle  d'économie  et  de  gestion);  Germany:  Prof.  Dr.  Peter  O.  Muelbert 
(University of Mainz), Prof. Dr. Klaus Hopt and Dr. Alexander Hellgardt (Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and 
Private  International  Law),    Prof.  Dr.  Theodor  Baums  and  Mr.  Tobias  Pohl  (Johann  Wolfgang  Goethe  University, 
Frankfurt/Main);  Greece:  Prof.  Dr.  Loukas  Spanos  (Centre  of  Financial  Studies,  University  of  Athens),  Dr.  Harilaos 
Mertzanis (Hellenic Capital Market Commission), Prof. Dr. Georgios D. Sotiropoulos (University of Athens); Hungary: 
Dr.Tamás Sándor (Sándor Bihary Szegedi Szent-Ivány Advocats), Dr. Andras Szecskay and Dr. Orsolya Görgényi (Szecskay 
Law  Firm  -  Moquet  Borde  &  Associés),  Prof.  Dr.  Adam  Boóc  and  Prof.  Dr.  Anna  Halustyik  (Corvinus  University  of 
Budapest); Iceland: Mr. Gunnar Sturluson and Mr. Olafur Arinbjorn Sigurdsson (LOGOS legal services), Dr. Aðalsteinn E. 
Jónasson    (Straumur  Investment  Bank  and  Reykjavik  University),  Mr.  David  Sch.  Thorssteinsson  (Iceland  Chamber  of 
Commerce);  Ireland Republic:  Dr.  Blanaid Clarke (University College  Dublin), Ms.  Kelley  Smith (Irish Law Library, 
Barrister); Italy: Prof. Dr. Guido Ferrarini and Mr. Andrea Zanoni (University of Genoa), Dr. Magda Bianco and Dr. Alessio 
Pacces (Banca d’Italia), Prof. Dr. Luca Enriques (Università di Bologna); Latvia: Prof. Dr. Kalvis Torgans and Dr. Pauls 
Karnups (University of Latvia), Mr. Uldis Cerps (Riga Stock Exchange); Lithuania: Mr. Virgilijus Poderys (Chairman) and 
Ms. Egle Surpliene (The Securities Commission of Lithuania0U5RODQGDV9DOL QDV'U-DXQLXV*XPELVDQG'U'RYLO 
%XUJLHQ  /LGHLND 3HWUDXVNDV 9DOL QDV LU SDUWQHULDL),  Dr.  Paulius  Cerka  (Vytautas  Magnus  University),  Mr.  Tomas 
Bagdanskis (Tomas Bagdanskis, Attorney at Law); Luxembourg: Mr. Jacques Loesch (Linklaters Loesch Law Firm), Mr. 
Daniel Dax (Luxembourg Stock Exchange); Netherlands: Prof. Dr. Jaap Winter (De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek, High 
Level Group of Company Law Experts European Commission Office (Chairman), University of Amsterdam), Mr. Marcel van 
de Vorst and Mr. Gijs van Leeuwen (Norton Rose Advocaten & Solicitors), Mr. Johan Kleyn and Dr. Barbara Bier (Allen & 
Overy LLP), Dr. Pieter Ariens Kappers (Boekel De Nerée), Prof. Dr. A.F. Verdam (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam), Prof. Mr. 
C.  A.  Schwarz  (Maastricht  University);  Norway:  Prof.  Dr.  Kristin  Normann  Aarum  (Oslo  University),  Prof.  Dr.  Tore 
Brathen (University of Tromsø), Prof. Dr. Jan Andersson (University of Bergen); Poland3URI6WDQLVáDZ6RáW\VL VNLDQG'U
Andrzej W. Kawecki (The law firm RI6RáW\VL VNL.DZHFNL	6]O ]DN), Mr. Igor Bakowski (Gotshal & Manges, Chajec, Don-
6LHPLRQ	 \WR6SN), Dr. Piotr Tamowicz,0U0DFLHM']LHU DQRZVNLDQG0U0LFKDá3U]\E\áRZVNL (7KH*GD VN,QVWLWXWH
for Market Economics), Ms. Anna Miernika-Szulc  (Warsaw Stock Exchange); Portugal: Mr. Victor Mendes (CMVM – 
Comissão  do  Mercado  de  Valores  Mobiliários),  Mr.  Carlos  Ferreira  Alves  (CEMPRE,  Faculdade  de  Economia, 
Universidade do Porto), Prof. Dr. Manuel Pereira Barrocas (Barrocas Sarmento Rocha - Sociedade de Advogados), Dr. Jorge 
de Brito Pereira (PLMJ - A.M. Pereira, Sragga Leal, Oliveira Martins, J dice e Associados - Sociedade de Advogados), Dr. 
Manuel Costa Salema, Dr. Carlos Aguiar, and Mr. Pedro Pinto (Law firm Carlos Aguiar P Pinto & Associados), Mr. Antonio 
Alfaia de Carvalho (Lebre Sá Carvalho & Associados); Romania: Mr. Gelu Goran  (Salans, Bucharest office), Dr. Sorin 
David (Law firm David & Baias SCPA), Ms. Adriana I. Gaspar (Nestor Nestor Diculescu Kingston Petersen, Attorneys & 
Counselors),  Mr.  Catalin  Baiculescu  and  Dr.  Horatiu  Dumitru  (Musat  &  Associates,  Attorneys  at  Law),  Ms.  Catalina 
Grigorescu  (Haarmann  Hemmelrath  Law  Firm);  Russia:  Dr.  Aleksandra  Vertlugina  (AVK  Security  &  Finance,  St. 
Petersburg); Slovak Republic: Dr. Jozef Makuch (Chairman) and Dr. Stanislav Škurla (Financial Market Authority, Slovak 
Republic), Dr. Frantisek Okruhlica (Slovak Governance Institute); Slovenia: Prof. Dr. Janez Prasnikar and Dr. Aleksandra 
Gregoric  (University  of  Ljubljana),  Prof.  Dr.  Miha  Juhart  (Chairman),  Mr.  Klemen  Podobnik,  and  Ms.  Ana  Vlahek 
(Securities  Market  Agency);  Spain:  Prof.  Dr.  Candido  Paz-Ares  (Universidad  Autonoma  de  Madrid),  Prof.  Dr.  Marisa 
Aparicio (Universidad Autonoma de Madrid and Universidad Pontificia Comillas de Madrid), Prof. Dr. Guillermo Guerra 
(Universidad Rey Juan Carlos); Sweden: Prof. Dr. Per Samuelsson and Prof. Dr. Gerard Muller (School of Economics and 
Management at Lund University), Prof. Dr. Rolf Dotevall (Göteborg University), Dr. Catarina af Sandeberg and Prof. Dr. 
Annina Persson (Stockholm University), Prof. Dr. Björn Kristiansson (Linklaters Sweden); Switzerland: Dr. Urs P. Gnos 
(Walder  Wyss  & Partners), Prof.  Dr. Gerard  Hertig (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology - ETH Zurich), Dr.  Michel 
Haymann  (Haymann  &  Baldi),  Prof.  Dr.  Wolfgang  Drobetz  (University  of  Basel  –  WWZ),  Prof.  Dr.  Karl  Hofstetter 
(Universität Zürich), Prof. Dr. Peter Nobel and Mr. Marcel Würmli (Universität St. Gallen); UK: Prof. Dr. Antony Dnes 
(Bournemouth University), Prof. Dr. Dan Prentice and Ms. Jenny Payne (Oxford University), Prof. Dr. Brian R Cheffins, Mr. 
Richard  Charles  Nolan,  and  Mr.  John  Armour  (University  of  Cambridge),  Prof.  Dr.  Paul  Davies  (London  School  of 
Economics),  Mr.  Gerard  N.  Cranley,  Ms.  Holly  Gregory,  and  Ms.  Ira  Millstein  (Weil,  Gotshal  &  Manges),  Ms.  Eva 
Lomnicka (University of London); US: Prof.  Mark Roe (University of Harvard), Prof. Dr. Edward Rock (University of 





Domicile and legal origin of bidding and target firms 
 
Legal origin is obtained from Djankov et al. (2004). The legal regimes of Russia and the Ukraine are 
defined  as  socialist.  Developed  Europe  includes  the  EU-15  countries,  Norway  and  Switzerland. 
Emerging European countries that appear in the sample are the EU-12 new member states, Croatia, 
Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey, Russia and the Ukraine. Developed non-European countries include 
Australia,  Canada,  Japan  and  the  US.  Emerging  non-European  countries  include  Argentina, 
Bangladesh,  Brazil, China, Egypt,  El  Salvador,  Guatemala, India,  Mexico,  Peru, Singapore,  South 
Africa, South Korea and Tanzania. 
Panel A: European bidders with abnormal bond returns 
    Legal origin of bidder country   
    Civil law 
     
Common 
law  French  German  Nordic 
Total 
Total    79  64  57  25  225 
Domestic deals  33  27  14  6  80 
Cross-border deals, of which:  46  37  43  19  145 
Legal origin of target country 
Common law  14  5  10  2  31 
French  19  13  8  2  42 
German  11  12  19  7  49 
Civil 
law 
Nordic  2  2  2  6  12 
Socialist  -  5  4  2  11 
Panel B: European targets with abnormal bond returns 
    Legal origin of target country   
    Civil law 
     
Common 
law  French  German  Nordic 
Total 
Total    13  4  4  3  24 
Domestic deals  6  2  2  2  12 
Cross-border deals, of which:  7  2  2  1  12 
Legal origin of bidder country 
Common law  -  -  1  -  1 
French  4  -  1  -  5 
German  3  2  -  -  5 
Civil 
law 
Nordic  -  -  -  1  1 
 





Multivariate regressions explaining target firm abnormal security returns 
 
The dependent variable is the abnormal bond or stock return depending on the specification. Abnormal returns are in % 
and  are  described  in  Panel  A  of  Appendix  1.  Abnormal  bond  returns  are  computed  using  equal-weighted  pricing 
benchmarks; results using value-weighted benchmarks are available on request. Each independent variable is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the description holds and zero otherwise. Variable descriptions are provided in Panels B and C of 
Appendix  1.  T-statistics  in  parentheses  use  standard  errors  adjusted  with  the  White  (1980)  correction  for 
heteroskedasticity. Variance inflation factors (VIF), tolerance, and condition indices are diagnostic measures testing for 
multicollinearity. Beta coefficients are compared in each pair of bond and stock regressions using a Wald F-test. a, b and c 
denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Model 1    Model 2    Model 3 
  
Dependent 
dummy variables  Bonds  Stocks 
F-test 
   Bonds  Stocks 
F-test 
   Bonds  Stocks 
F-test 
-2.84  2.32  (0.12)     -4.09  -0.06  (0.15)     -2.94  0.73  (0.09)  Cross-border deal 
(-1.30)  (0.16)      (-1.81)
c  (-0.00)      (-1.16)  (0.05)   
-3.20  7.22  (0.85)    -4.32  4.81  (0.66)    -3.11  1.07  (0.14)  Target is common law 
(-1.16)  (0.79)      (-1.55)  (0.54)      (-1.92)
c  (0.09)   
-1.06  -1.38  (0.00)    -4.41  -5.95  (0.01)    -7.80  4.03  (0.67)  Creditor rights better in 
    target country  (-0.52)  (-0.12)      (-1.65)  (-0.76)      (-3.22)
b  (0.32)   
0.17  5.35  (0.08)                  Credit contract enforcement 
    better in target country  (0.06)  (0.33)                   










































Rule of law 
    better in target country  (2.62)
b  (0.26)        (2.17)
c  (0.57)        (2.83)
b  (-0.14)    
-2.04  10.10  (1.05)                         Diversifying deal 
(-0.87)  (1.03)                   
                -1.36  -7.20  (0.29)  Equity or mixed financing 
                (-0.73)  (-0.64)   
0.83  18.73  (3.52)
c    -0.16  25.18  (5.09)
b    -3.79  34.22  (17.55)
a  Tender offer 
(0.47)  (2.08)
c      (-0.10)  (2.76)
b      (-2.27)
c  (3.43)
b   
-2.92  9.14  (1.14)    -0.96  -2.25  (0.01)          Hostile bid 
(-1.45)  (1.21)      (-0.49)  (-0.20)           
-3.47  2.64  (0.35)                  Announcement after 2000 
(-1.66)  (0.28)                   




































Completed deal  
        (2.02)
c  (-1.36)      (1.77)  (-1.32)   
            -1.43  -11.64  (0.69)              Relative size target/bidder > 
    > sample median          (-0.90)  (-1.13)           
        -5.67  -13.77  (0.37)    -8.62  -3.59  (0.09)  Asset risk combined > 
    > asset risk target          (-2.55)
b  (-2.12)
c      (-3.61)
a  (-0.31)   
        4.83  -16.74  (3.05)    6.08  -31.06  (11.88)
b  Leverage combined > 
    > leverage target          (1.78)  (-1.82)
c      (2.60)
b  (-2.69)
b   



































Interest coverage combined > 
    > interest coverage target          (1.38)  (1.24)           
4.95  -7.64        -0.08  17.51        2.79  19.71     Intercept 
(1.77)
c  (-1.05)        (-0.03)  (1.44)        -1.35  (1.24)    
Adjusted R
2  0.10  0.22      0.06  0.40      0.11  0.56   
F-test  2.56
c  2.71
b      2.86
c  9.00
a      6.35
b  144.10
a   
Number of observations  24      22      17   
Mean VIF  2.59      2.77      3.32   
Maximum VIF  4.88      4.17      4.72   
Minimum tolerance  0.21      0.24      0.21   
Condition number  9.72        13.14        14.08    
 
 